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CONTROLLED COMPETITION: THREE YEARS
OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACTt
NEIL

G.

MELONE*

INTRODUCTION

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was an attempt to remedy a
situation in the air transport industry which was characterized as
"chaotic" by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.'
From 1930 to 1934, the entire aviation industry had been dominated by three holding companies. 2 As a result of the so-called
"spoils conferences" called by Postmaster General Brown in 1930,
certain of these groups had secured the bulk of the government's
airmail payments. Investigations by the Black Committee had revealed the alleged details of the "spoils conferences" and the extent
of the interlocking relationships." On the basis of the testimony,
Postmaster General Farley had cancelled the contracts in 1934 without notice or hearing. 4 The experiment of mail flying by army pilots
had proved disastrous, and remedy was sought in the Air Mail Act
of 1934.5
Mail contracts were to be awarded after competitive bidding,
and routes designated by the Postmaster General. 6 The Act required
the air transport companies to divorce themselves from manufacturtAdapted from Thesis submitted to Professor Hart in Seminar on Federal
Administration at Harvard Law School.
*Member of Minnesota Bar.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 2. For an excellent
history of the industry prior to 1938, see Hamstra, Two Decades-Federal AeroRegulation in Perspective (1941) 12 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 105-133.
2. United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, North American Aviation
Co., and Aviation Corporation.
3. Hearings before Special Committee on Investigation of Air Mail and
Ocean Mail Contracts, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1933-34), parts 1-9.
For charts portraying the extent of interlocking directorates and stock control of air transport companies in 1934, see 78 Cong. Rec. 4977 (1934).
4. The controversies raised by this action now present very live Issues in
the pending suits by the United Air Lines Companies In the Court of Claims.
The three companies seek to recover $3,110,555 for mail carried during January
and part of February, 1934, plus anticipated mail pay the plaintiffs would have
received had they been permitted to complete their contracts. The government
counterclaimed to the extent of $23,409,953, alleging Illegal and collusive combinations to prevent the making of bids at the "spoils conference." Reference
was made to Commissioner Richard H. Akers, who filed his report on July 14,
1941. The Commissioner made extensive findings of fact, concluding that the
plaintiffs' contracts were secured through open competitive bidding, and that
there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the government's claim of fraud,
collusion, or conspiracy.
5. 48 Stat. 933 (1934). Actually the remedy was sought under an earlier
act, 17 Stat. 314, 39 U.S.C. 432 (1872). Routes were readvertised under that
Act on March 30, 1934; the Air Mail Act of 1934 was not approved until June
12, 1934.
6. Secs. 3, 4, and 5.
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hag interests in order to secure these subsidies.7 It prohibited mail
contractors competing in parallel routes from merging or from entering into agreements which might result in common control or ownership.8 A measure of economic regulatory power was divided between
the Post Office,9 the Interstate Commerce Commission,' 0 and the
Department of Commerce."
The Act soon proved itself no more than a stopgap, for the
Big Three were reincarnated in the Big Four:12 the personnel
remained substantially the same, and most of the routes were retained; the same interests continued to hold the field, under different
names.1 3 Moreover, the undesirability and injustice of competitive
bidding for mail contracts soon made itself apparent. While virtually no competition had existed in the industry prior to 1934, the
system of bidding for routes gave rise to disastrous rate wars
between competing lines. 14 The larger lines would bid a ridiculously
low price in order to buy the route, while the smaller operators were
prevented from bidding successfully.1 5 Admittedly, compensation
of a few mills per airplane mile was not remunerative of the services
which the mail contractor rendered. The larger airlines which had
bid successfully incurred severe operating losses, 16 while some of
the smaller companies disappeared in bankruptcy. One hundred and
twenty million dollars of private capital had been invested in commercial aviation, one-half of this sum having been wiped out.'
This situation the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193818 was designed
7.

Sec. 7

8.

See. 15.

9.

Note 6, supra.

10.
11.

See. 6.
Sees. 11, 12.

12. American Airlines, Inc., United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., and Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
13.
McKellar, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations on First Supplemental Civil Functions Appropriations Bill for 1941, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940), 216.

14. The Commerce Committee, in reporting out S. 3845, viewed the extreme
competition among air carriers as a prime evil which jeopardized their financial
stability. It considered the existing laws inadequate and obsolete because the
airlines had altered their status from airmail contractors to common carriers;

and it declared that aviation under the existing laws was unsatisfactory
investors, labor, and the air carriers themselves.

to

Sen. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong.,

3rd Sess. (1938) 2 In the Congressional debates, the two fundamental needs
of aviation in 19A8 were said to be security of route and protection against cutthroat competition. Lea, 83 Cong. Rec. 6407 (1938).
15.

Lea, 83 Cong. Rec. 7069 (1938).

But the writer is advised by Mr. Paul

M. Godehn that United Air Lines' bids were close to the maximum on each route,
and that United was underbid on the Chicago-Dallas route by Braniff; see
Finding No. 129 of Commissioner Akers' report in United Air Lines Transport
Corporation v. United States, Note 4, supra.

16. Mr. Godehn adds that United would have incurred losses even at the
maximum rates permitted by the advertisements of March 30, 1934.
17. Gorrell Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H.R. 9738, 7dth Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938)

298; Hearings before Subcommittee

of Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3659, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 30.
18. 52 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 401 (Supp. 1940).
Discussions of the Act are found in Hamstra, Two Decades-Federal AeroRegulation in

Perspective (1941)

11 JOURNAL or AIa LAW 105

133-147

Hester,

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (1938) 9 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 451; Hester,
The State and the Nation under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (1938). 9
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to rectify. The declaration of policy19 requires the Civil Aeronautics
Board to:"consider the following, among other things, as, being ,in
the public interest, and in. accordance with the public convenience
and necessity-

"(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or
destructive competitive practices;
"(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of
the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national
defense ;-20
The statute does not prescribe competition at all events; it does
not say that competition is to be maintained, but the Board is to
consider its necessity. 21 How much competition must exist under
the terms of the Act, and how much may exist before it becomes
wasteful and destructive ?22 What is the Board's concetjt of monopoly
and competition as evolved in the cases it has decided during the
first three years of its existence? Is its concept the same when
applied to the field of granting new routes as when applied to the
field of regulating business practices? And to what extent has the
Board carried out the Congressional intention in its disposition of'
the cases according to its interpretation of the statutory standards?
These are the problems raised by Section 2(c) and (d). The Act
attempted to swing the pendulum away from unrestrained competition, but not to the extreme of monopolistic control. "While it is not
the purpose of this article to suggest the present position of the
pendulum, it is its purpose to indicate the considerations which have
guided the Civil Aeronautics Board in its decisions. 23 . An exanainaJOURNAL OF AIR LAW 635 ; Gorrell, The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Demo-

cratic Government (1938), 9 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 703; Leroy, Civil Aeronautics
Authority (1938), 9 Air L. Rev. 315: Note (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 137.
For the legislative precedents of the Act, see Hearings before Committee on
Commerce on S. 3760, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (19:8) 12, and ITeariligs on H.R
928 (note 17, supra), at 305, 306.
19. Sec. 2.
20. Sec. 2(d) first appeared in S. 3845 in the form of an anlncItnent added
by the Committee on Commerce, which the Senate adopted with little discussion.

8

Cong. Rec. 6730, 6748 (1938).
21. Note 128, ifra.

22.
"There must be enough competition to serve as a. spur to the eager
search for progress, but there must not be so much as to raise costs materially
through the duplication of facilities."
Report of the Federal Aviation Corn-

mission, Sen. Doc. No. 15, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (195) 62.
23. A confusion in terminology was apparent in the statute as enacted in
1938, and was remedied by Reorganization Plan No. IV. Sec. 7. effective: on
.June

:;0.

1940.

5

Fed.

Eeg.

2421-2423

(1940).

SInce

that

date,

the

word
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tion will be made of the opinions dealing with the issuance or denial
of certificates of convenience and necessity, and with the regulation
of the business practices of the air carriers.

CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY

Prior to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
certificates of convenience and necessity had been familiar administrative devices for the regulation of business affected with the
public interest. 24 Colonel Edgar G. Gorrell, President of the Air
Transport Association of America, in testifying before various committees, gave most illuminating and persuasive arguments in behalf
of their use in the regulation of the air transport industry. He considered them a means of giving the air carriers a reasonable assurance
of the permanency of their operation, 25 and of protecting them
against ruinous competition. The requirement of a certificate of
convenience and necessity would afford an orderly procedure to
provide for minimum standards of service to be complied with before
operations were commenced. This device would not only protect
existing lines, but would remedy the precarious position in which
small aspirants would find themselves if the establishment of un26
warranted services were permitted.
At the same time, he stated emphatically that these certificates
would in no sense sanction a monopoly. In the first place, the
existing Air Mail Law itself created a monopoly since no airmail
contractor was permitted to fly parallel to the line of another airmail
contractor, or to maintain a passenger or express service off the
line of his airmail route which competed in any way with the passenger or express service available on another airmail route.2 7 In the
second place, he declared it most unlikely that a monopoly could
ever arise in the air transportation industry because of its inherent
nature. It was highly competitive not only within itself, but with
"Authority" is the over-all term referring to the Administrator and the five-man
body, while the latter is termed the "Civil Aeronautics Board." For the purposes
of this discussion, the word "Authority" is taken to mean the five-man board
until the reorganization; that body will be called the "Board" in dealing with
the cases decided after June 30, 1940.
24. They were first adopted by several states as an administrative continuance of the system of granting legislative franchises to public utilities. Their
first appearance In the federal scheme was under the Transportation Act of
1920, to regulate new railroad construction; they were later adopted by the
Communications Act of 1934 and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
25. Congressman Lea stated that their purpose was to assure security of
route, which is declared to be one of the two fundamental needs of aviation.
83 Cong. Rec. 6406 (1938).
26. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H.R. 6234, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 66.
27. 48 Stat. 938 (193t).
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highway and railroad systems. On the contrary, there was more
danger of irresponsible and ruinous competition than of any mono28

polistic control.

A. Domestic Air Carriers
1. GrandfatherCertificates
One of the first matters which the newly installed Authority
had to consider, and which occupied it for a considerable time afterwards, was the flood of applications for routes under the "grandfather clause," Section 401(e) (1) of the Act. In general, under the
terms of this subsection, an applicant is entitled to a certificate
authorizing air transportation over the route which it used in continuous operations as an air carrier from May 14 to August 22, 1938,
unless its service was inadequate or inefficient. Broad questions of
public convenience and necessity were thus precluded by the statute
from coming before the Authority for determination, since the principal issues were confined to the citizenship of the applicant, the
scope and continuity of its operation, the extent of its authorization
by the Postmaster General, and the adequacy and efficiency of its
service. It is noteworthy that it differs from the Motor Carrier
Act 29 in not requiring bona fide operation during the grandfather
period.80
In debates and hearings, Congress spent more time in the consideration of this clause than it did in the consideration of any other
provision of the Act. 81 The purpose of this provision was to give a
preferential place to those who had expended money, energy, and
initiative in pioneering an airline.8 2 To require an established carrier
to prove convenience and necessity before it was permitted to continue
its service would in effect penalize it for having pioneered a service,
while the fact of an established service should be a sufficient guarantee of public convenience and necessity to warrant its continuance.U2
Furthermore, it was felt by the proponents of the bill that if there
28. Hearings on H.R. 5234 (note 36, supra), at 67.
29. 49 Stat. 551, 552 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 306, 309 (Supp. 1940).
30. The Authority pointed out this distinction In Marquette Airlines, Inc.,
Grandfather Proceeding, Order No. 99, Docket No. 7-401 (E)-i (July 19, 1939),
and overruled TWA's contention that such proof was required.
(on
31. Dobates: 83 Cong. Rec. 6632, 6727, 6767-6769, 6848-6852 (1938)
(on H.R. 9738). Hearings on H.R.
83 Cong. Rec. 7068-7078 (19.18)
S. 3845)
9738 (note 17, supra.) at 39, 40 90, 94-99, 173-179, 195-201; Hearings on S. 3760
upra) at 18-20;
(note 18, supra) at 13-16 ; Hearings on S. 3659 (note 17,
Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2,
No. 2635, 75th
H.R.
Rep.
432-434,
497-500.
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) at
Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) 68-69 ; H.R. Rep. NTo.2254, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938)
6-7.
32. McCarren, 83 Cong. Rec. 6769, 6848 (1938) ; Hester, Hearings on R.R.
8788 (note 17, aupra) at 39.
33. Gorreli, Hearings on S. 2 (note 31, supra), at 498.
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were no grandfather period during which continuous services were
required prior to the passage of the bill, bidders might acquire rights
that were not warranted, and there would be a mad scramble to
establish routes and secure airmail contracts that would destroy the
34
industry.
All hearings on applications by domestic air carriers under the
grandfather clause were completed by January 1, 1939. 8 5 Between
February 25, 1939, and July 31, 1940, the Authority granted grandfather certificates to nineteen domestic carriers86 and denied the
applications of two domestic carriers. 7 Most of these applications
were disposed of without opposition, and by a stereotyped review
of the evidence to support the requisite findings. In four of these
cases,8 8 other airlines intervened or entered appearances89 to contest
the inclusion of certain airmail stops on these routes, but the disposition of these conflicting claims involved no formulations of new
policy. But in a fifth case 40 the inclusion of an intermediate point was
challenged as falling within the proviso of Section 401 (e) (1).41
34. Gorrell, ibid. McCarran, 83 Cong. Rec. 6850 (1938) ; Lea, 83 Cong. Rec.
7069 (1938) ; Lea, Hearings on H.R. 9738 (note 17, supra), at 174.
35. Rhyne, The Civil Aeronautics Act Annotated (1989), 110.
36. Delta Air Corporation, Order No. 5, Docket No. 8-401(E)-i (Feb. 25.
1989). Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., Order No. 13, Docket No. 3-401(E)-i
(March 7. 1939). Continental Air Lines, Inc., Order No. 14, Docket No.
2-401(E)-i (March 9, 1939). Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc., Order No.
20, Docket No. 4-401(E)-i (March 17, 1939). Northwest Airlines, Inc., Order
No. 21, Docket No. 42-401(E)-i (March 14, 1939), (also received certificate
for Canadian route). National Airlines, Inc., Order No. 22, Docket Nos. 5-401
(E)-I and -2 (March 14, 1939). Inland Air Lines, Inc., Order No. 27, Docket
No. 26-401(E)-i (March 28, 1939). Western Air Express Corporation, Order
No. 29, Docket No. 31-401(E)-i (April 7, 1939). Pennsylvania-Central Airlines
Corporation, Order No. 38, Docket No. 18-401(E)-i (April 21, 1939). American
Airlines, Inc., Order No. 53, Docket No. 22-401(E)-i (May 9, 1939). United Air
Lines Transport Corporation, Order No. 57, Docket No. 16-401(E)-i (May 22,
1939), (also received certificates for Canadian route). Boston-Maine Airways,
Inc., Order No. 59, Docket No. 13-401(E)-i (May 31, 1939), also received certificate for Canadian route). Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Order No. 67, Docket No.
9-401(E)-1 (June 9 1939). Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., Order No.
70, Docket No. 17-401(E)-1 (June 16, 1939). Braniff Airways, Incorporated,
Order No. 90, Docket Nos. 1-401(E)-i and -2 (July 18, 1939). Marquette Airlines, Inc., Order No. 99, Docket No. 7-401(E)-i (July 19, 1939). Wilmington
Catalina Airline, Ltd., Order No. 220, Docket No. 24-401(E)-i (October 13,
1939). Tri-State Aviation Corporation, Order No. 608, Docket No. 59-401(E)-i,
2 C.A.B. 159 (July 31, 1940). Mayflower Airlines, Inc., Order No. 609, Docket
No. 46-401(E)-i 2 C.A.B. 175 (July 31, 1940).
37. Airline Feeder System, Inc., Order No. 65, Docket No. 57-401(E)-i
(June 9, 1939), (no continuous operation) ; Condor Airlines, Inc., Order No. 424,
Docket No. 23-401(E)-i, 1 C.A.J. 140, 1 C.A.A. LXXXVI (March 8, 1940), (no
continuous operation, no operation as interstate carrier).
38. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, (Pennsylvania-Central appeared) ; Eastern Air Lines, Inc., (Braniff and Delta intervened and American
appeared); Braniff Airways, Incorporated, (Eastern intervened); Marquette
Airlines, Inc., (TWA intervened).
39. Under Rule 4 of the Authority's Atules of Practice.
40. Transcontinental and Western Air, inc., Uranafather Proceeamg, ,ote
36, supra. This was the Boulder City stop. In order to assure its inclusion on
TWA'S route, Mr. Jack Frye, president of TWA, had urged that the date commencing the grandfather period be moved up from December 1, 1937, to the date
of the passage of the Act. Hearings on S. 3760 (note 18, supra) at 13-16;
Hearings on iI.R. 9738 (Note 17, supra) at 174-177, 191-193, 195-201. When
the suggestion was made during the debates on S. 3845, Senator McCarran
opposed it on the ground that it would do away with the grandfather clause
entirely. 83 Cong. Rec. 6769 (1938). The Joint committee set the date at May
14, 1938. H.R. Rep. No. 2635 (note 31, supra), at 68.
41. "Provided that no applicant holding an air-mail contract shall receive
a certificate authorizing it to serve any point not named in such contract as
awarded to It and not served by it prior to April 1, 1938, if any other air carrier

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

The Authority found that the applicant's service to that point competed directly with the intervener's service to a nearby city, and that
the intervener was adversely affected by this service. But the requisite
finding of public convenience and necessity was based on the convenience to passengers of direct air transportation to the proposed
point, and the possible saving in operating costs to the applicant
resulting therefrom.
Several grandfather applications have involved the definition of
an "air carrier" within the meaning of the Act, and the extent of an
airline's interstate operations so as to bring it within the jurisdiction
of the Civil Aeronautics Board. An express company, not engaging
in the physical carriage of property by aircraft but acting as an
intermediary between the shipper and the ultimate operator of the
aircraft, has been held to be an air carrier within the definitions of
Section 1.42 But although a company is formed actually to engage in
the physical transportation of persons, property, and mail by air,
it does not become all air carrier within the purview of Section 408
until it obtains a certificate of convenience and necessity. 43 While a
grandfather certificate will be denied if an air carrier operated as
such only spasmodically and not continuously during the grandfather
period, 44 the Board will not refuse to assume jurisdiction to entertain
the application when the line has operated only in one state. 45 This
latter view is consistent with the Board's position in two other cases.
Without considering the entirely intrastate nature of an airline's
operations, it has granted its application on the bare showing of
continuous operations during the grandfather period. 46 And it successfullv contended that a certificate was required for an entirely
intrastate route when passengers might use it as a segment of an
competitively serving the same point under authority of a contract as awarded
to such air carrier shall prove that it Is adversely affected thereby, and If the
Authority shall also find that transportation by the applicant to and from such
point is not required by the public convenience and necessity."
42. Railway Express Agency, Inc., Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, Order No. 940, Docket No. 19-401(E)-I 2 CA.B. (March 13, 1941)
(Mr. Mason dissented on this point, but concurreA In ihe view that Sec. 401(e)
does not require nor authorize the issuance of certificates for operations such as
those conducted by the applicant).
43. American Export Airlines, Inc., Application for Approval of Control by
American Export Lines, Inc., Order No. 581, Docket No. 319, 2 C.A.B. 45 (July
12, 1940)
(The Board was reversed on this point on Pan American's appeal, see
note 182, infra)
44. Note 37. Ru pra.
45. Condor Airlines, Inc., Grandfather Proceeding, (Note 37, suipra) ; The
Authority said: "Continuous existence of 'interstate air transportation' during
the grandfather period does not depend solely on applicant's operation of aircraft between the certain geographical points listed In section 1(21), but may
also be determined by the interstate character of the flow of traffic transported
between these points . . . The fact that applicant has operated wholly between
points in California does not necessarily establish that It did not engage in
Interstate air transportation during the grandfather period." 1 C.A.J. 142,
1 C.A.A. LXXXVIII.
46. Mayflower Airlines, Inc., Grandfather Proceeding, note 36, supra. (Passengers and express from Boston to Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, and Nantucket; since operations are inherently seasonal, the Board considered continuity of scheduled service after June 15, 1938, rather than May 14).
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interstate journey, and when the airline was already engaged in
47
foreign air transportation over another authorized route.
Two cases 48 have involved the so-called "mandatory routes"those for which the Authority was required by Section 401 (e) (2)
to issue certificates "notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Act."'49 Only one of these cases raised issues of significance, and it
is treated in the next section.
2. New Route Certificates50
The Act, after prohibiting any air carrier from engaging in air
transportation without a certificate, provides in Section 401(d) (1)
that the Board shall issue a certificate if it finds that the applicant
is fit, willing, and able to perform the service, and that such transportation is required by the public convenience and necessity.
a. Uncontested Applications
Although the first new route application 5 ' was uncontested, the
Authority realized that it was breaking new ground, and took
occasion to discuss the standards which should govern such proceedings. The heart of Section 401(d) (1) is the prescribed finding that
the proposed service is required by "the public convenience and
necessity." This phrase, said the Authority, "is susceptible of no
exact definition, and its meaning must be largely ascertained by
reference to the context and objectives of the particular statute in
47. Civil Aeronautics l3oard v. Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., (D.C.N.Y.,
1940), noted 12 Air L. Rev. 73 (1941) (Defendant having contended that its
line was entirely intrastate and therefore did not require a certificate, a consent
decree was entered permanently enjoining it from operating an airline without
the Board's consent). See also Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc., Montreal(July 7, 1941).
Nassau Service, Order No. 1126, Docket No. 601, 2 C.A.B. where the Board held that Canadian Colonial's service between Montreal and
Nassau, with an overnight stop at Jacksonville for safety reasons, was not
"foreign air transportation" within the meaning of the Act, and hence was not
"air transportation"; the complaints of Pan American and Eastern were dismissed, since the service required neither a certificate of convenience and necessity nor a foreign air carrier permit.
48. Continental Air Lines, Inc., et al., Witchita-Pueblo Route, Order No. 43,
Docket Nos. 2-401(E)-2 and 150 (April 28, 1939) : Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
Bismarck-Milnot Operation, Order No 475, Docket No. 328, 1 C.A.J. 208, 1 C.A.A.CXLVIII (April 9, 1940).
49. The appropriation bill of March 1, 1938, had authorized the carriage
of airmail over these routes, and had made the necessary appropriations: contracts had been let after competitive bidding, and work had already been commenced by the airlines. The Senate added this subsection to S. 3845 with the
intention of putting these eight lines on the same basis as the existing lines,
and of bringing them within the protection of the grandfather clause. Senator
McCarran referred to this subject as the most controversial one In the entire
study of the proposed bill, and opposed the insertion of the amendment as
protection of "grandchildren" rather than "grandfathers", and as undermining
the whole purpose of the grandfather clause. See 83 Cong. Rec. 6848, 6850
(1938).
50. A general discussion of this problem appears In Lupton, New Route
Certificates under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (1941) 12 Air L. Rev. 103.
51. Northwest Airlines Inc., Duluth-Twin Cities Operation, Order No. 417,
Docket Nos. 181 and 232, 1 6.A.J. 123, 1 C.A.A. LXVI (March 6, 1940). Editorial
comment In 11 JOURNAL oF Aia LAw 163 (1940) suggests that the opinion may
become as famous In air transportation as Smyth v. Ames and the Minnesota
Rate Cases have become in the general field of public utility rate-making.
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which it is used."152 It then recited the declaration of policy contained in Section 2.
"Obviously, in the light of these standards, it was not the
congressional intent that the air transportation system of the
country should be 'frozen' to its present pattern. 58 On the other
hand, it is equally apparent that Congress intended the Authority
to exercise a firm control over the expansion of air transportation
routes in order to prevent the scramble for routes which might
occur under a 'laissez faire' policy. Congress, in defining the
problem, clearly intended to avoid the duplication of transportation facilities and services, the wasteful competitive practices,
such as the opening of nonproductive routes, and other uneconomic results which characterized the development of other
modes of transportation
prior to the time of their governmental
'5 4
regulation.
The opinion next outlined some of the primary considerations
which should govern the disposition of such applications: (1)
whether the new service will serve a useful public purpose, responsive
to a public need; (2) whether this purpose can and will be served
as well by existing lines or carriers; (3) whether it can be served
by the applicant with the new service without impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest; (4) and
whether any cost of the proposed service to the government will be
outweighed by the benefit which will accrue to the public from the
new service.55
Other uncontested applications have raised questions of competitive duplication of service and of authorization to operate for
only a part of the year. An intermediate stop may be permitted on
an existing route though a competing line already provides the same
service between that stop and one terminal point, if the rival routes
do not parallel each other through the major portion of their lengths,
but converge and continue to a common terminal for a relatively
52. 1 C.A J., at 126, 1 C.A.A., at LXIX.
53. Senator King expressed concern that S. 3845, especially the grandfather
clause, might "freeze" existing routes; Senator McCarran answered that It was
not the purpose of the bill "that any line might be 'frozen' nor that any line
might be perpetuated, nor that any monopoly over any terrain might be established to the exclusion of the necessity which the public may present." 83 Cong.
Rec. 6851-6852 (1938). See also, Report of Federal Aviation Commission, Sen.
Doec. No. 15, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 62.
54. 1 C.A.J., at 127, 1 C.A.A., at LXX.
55. With respect to this fourth point, the opinion declared: "...
unless
exceptional circumstances, such as the particular importance of a route from
the standpoint of the national defense, exist In a given case . . . (the relationship between the estimated commercial revenues and operating costs of the
proposed service) . . . should not initially impose upon the Government an
unduly large proportion of the total operating cost.

Conditions surrounding the

operation of any service receiving a certificate should also be such as to justify
an anticipation that commercial

revenues will show an increasing

tendency to

rise, with a consequent and progressive decrease in the degree of the carrier's
dependence on the Government." 1 C.A.S., at 128, 1 C.A.A., at LXXTT.
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short distance." And when traffic between points of a proposed
new route is seasonal and insufficient to justify service during the
entire year, limited service will be authorized. 5 7
Few problems that are difficult or at all relevant to the present
discussion have been raised in cases under Section 401(h), in which
the Board has considered the uncontested application of an airline
for the inclusion of an intermediate stop,5" for the extension to a
new terminal, 59 for the authorization of direct service between two
points, 60 or for authority to carry mail, 61 on existing routes. And
purely formal in their nature are proceedings under Section 401(h)
to amend a certificate so as to reflect a change in the name of the
62
company holding it.
b. Formal Interventions and Consolidated Proceedings
Rule 4(b) of the Board's Rules of Practice permits "any person
having a substantial interest in the subject matter of any proceeding"
to intervene and become a party.63 When two or more applications
56. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Pittsburg, Youngstown, Erie,
Buffalo Operations, Order No. 575, Docket No. 247, 296, 1 C.A.J. 378, 1 C.A.A.
CCCIII (June 28, 1940) ; noted in 11 Air L. Rev. 405 (1940), at 406-408.
57. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Grand Rapids-Traverse City
Operation, Order No. 660, Docket No. 242, 2 C.A.B. 275 (Sept. 26, 1940) (May
1 to October 31).
58. Continental Air Lines, Inc., Roswell-Hobbs-Carlsbad Operation, Order
No. 425, Docket Nos. 265, 285, 1 C.A.J. 144, 1 C.A.A. XCI (March 8, 1940) ;
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., St. Louis-Nashville-Muscle Shoals Operation Order No.
574, Docket Nos. 9-401(B)-5 and 230, 1 C.A.J. 360, 1 C.A.A. CCLXRXIV (June
28, 1940) (New route from St. Louis to Nashville, via Evansville, also granted) ;
United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Red Bluff Operation, Order No. 573,
Docket No. 261, 1 C.A.J. 347, 1 C.A.A. CCLXIX (June 28, 1940); United Air
Lines Transport Corporation, Philadelphia-Camden Amendment, Order No. 556,
Docket No. 419 (June 14, 1940) (passengers and express only) ; American
Airlines, Inc., Bridgeport, Conn., Operation, Order No. 813, Docket No. 324;
2 C.A.B. (Jan. 14, 1941) ; Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Boulder City
Operation, Order No. 982, Docket No. 273, 2 C.A.B. (April 16, 1941);
Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Service to Tr-Citles, Order No. 920,
Docket Nos. 550 and 551, 2 C.A.B. (March 5, 1941) ; Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Morgantown Operation, Order No. 1128, Docket No. 572,
2 C.A.B. (July 10,al941) ; Inland Air Lines, Inc., Alliance, Nebr., Operation,
Order No. 750, Docket No. 438, 2 C.A.B. 346 (Dec. 2. 1940) ; Canadian Colonial
Airways, Inc., Burlington-Albany-Glens Falls-Lake Placid Operations, Order
No. 1151, Docket No. 877, 402, and 494, 2 C.A.B. (July 7, 1941) (Also
permitting carrier to begin and/or terminate trips at points short of terminal
points). Note also the permission granted to Northwest to consolidate its two
routes Into a single route, in order to eliminate the necessity of stops at Fargo
and Yakima; Northwest Airlines, Inc., Order No. 586, Docket Nos. 279 and 409,
2 C.A.B. 96 (July 18, 1940).
59. Catalina Air Transport, Service to Santa Catalina. Island, Order No.
1158, Docket Nos. 538 and 487, 2 C.A.B. - (July 22, 1941).
60. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Muskegon-Chicago Service,
Order No. 1051, Docket No. 565, 2 C.A.B. - (May 17, 1941).
61. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Seattle-Vancouver Mail
Service, Order No. 1011, Docket No. 496, 2 C.A.B. (March 19 1941); Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc Additional Mail Service, Order ko. 305, Docket
Nos. 295, 297, 1 C.A.J. 23, 1 6.A.A. VIII, (Dec. 20, 1939) ; United Air Lines
Transport Corporation, Additional Mail Service-Philadelphia, Order No. 768,
Docket Nos. 323 and 321, 2 C.A.B. (Dec. 18, 1940).
62. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Change of Name, Order No. 861, Docket No.
513, 2 C.A.B. (Jan. 29, 1941) (Formerly Boston-Maine Airways, Inc.);
Western Air Lines, Inc., Change of Name, Order No. 1152, Docket No. 579,
2 C.A.B. (July 9, 1941) (Formerly Western Air Express Corporation) ; Catalina Air Transport, Change of Name, Order No. 1158, Docket Nos. 538 and 487,
2 C.A.B. (July 22, 1941) (Formerly Wilmington-Catalina Airline, TAd.).
63. Rule 4(b) of See. 286.1 of the Economic Regulations. Rule 4(a)
permits any person or public body to appear at any hearing regardless of its
interest In the subject matter, and present any evidence which Is relevant to the
Issue.
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for new routes relate to the same route or to different routes located

in the same competitive area, the Board has usually ordered the
applications to be consolidated for a single hearing. This procedure
is not governed by a rule of practice, but has been adopted as a
64

matter of convenience.

In consolidated proceedings, or those in which another carrier
intervenes, the question of competition has arisen in four different
types of situations. For convenience, each type will be discussed
separately.
(1) Consolidated applications for inclusion of same intermediate point.
When the addition of the same intermediate point is sought by
two or more carriers under Section 401(h), the questions raised
are essentially the same as in any other consolidated applications.
The Board must first decide whether the additional service is required
at all; if so, it must next determine whether both applicants should
be authorized to conduct the operations, or in the event that it is
found that only one should be so authorized, which should be
selected. Where the city is of sufficient commercial and industrial
significance, and where the types of proposed service are different,
the applications of both airlines have been granted.6 5 But where
these factors are not present, the award has been given to that route
whose cities show the greater volume of traffic passing to and from
the point in question;06 additional makeweights are the anticipated
amount of revenue which operation by one would divert from the
other, and the relative cost to the airlines of the new service. 7 The
only consolidated application for a new terminal point, the famous
North Beach Airport case,0 8 may be mentioned more for its notoriety
than for its bearing upon the competition-monopoly problem.
(2) No existing service between any points on route; two or
more applicants propose service between the same termini.
G4.
See. 1001 of the Act provides that the Board "may conduct its proceedIngs in such manner as will be conducive to the proper dispatch of business and
to the ends of justice."

65.

United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Youngstown Operation, Order

No. 953, Docket

Nos. 269 and 449, 2 C.A.B. -

(March 19,

1941)

(Youngstown

designated as stop on routes of United and PCA; United's service being transcontinental, and PCA's being short-haul inter-city service).
66. Delta Air Corporation, et al., Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, Order No. 869, Docket No. 162 et al., 2 C.A.B. (Jan. 30, 1941) (Brunswick, Ga., Included as intermediate point on Eastern's existing route, rather
than as terminal of Delta's new routes; such service would involve little additional cost and no additional mileage).
67. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., Reading Operation, Order No.
1028, Docket Nos. 380 and 466, 2 C.A.B. (May 3, 1941) (Granting application
of TWA and denying that of United, both being transcontinental carriers On
this route).
68. American Airlines, et al., New York Airport, Order No. 254, Docket
Nos. 278, 282, 284, 302 (Nov. 7, 1939) (Over violent protest of City of Newark,
Now York and Newark designated as co-terminals on routes of American,
Eastern, TWA, and United).
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The first question is, again, whether the public convenience and
necessity require the inauguration of the route at all. Only twice
in this situation has the Board decided the question in the negative,
once because the service was not warranted by the traffic needs of the
territory,6 9 and once because similar routes were applied for by other
applicants in pending proceedings.7" If the answer is affirmative, the
Board must either choose one of the applicants to be the sole
operator, or must permit competition between two or more of the
applicants. In all of the cases so far decided, the traffic needs of the
territory have admittedly warranted operations by only one airline;
the ultimate question has been the selection of the carrier.
Where one applicant has never engaged in air transportation,
and its executives have had little experience in the business, the new
service will be granted to the established carrier which is financially
able-to provide and maintain the additional equipment needed. 71 And
where one applicant appears to have given greater consideration
and effort to the problems involved in the establishment of the proposed route, and has a superior record of past operations, it will be
preferred. 7 2 If the proposed route is but a short segment of the
distance already sought by one applicant, and its operation by that
applicant would entail the establishment of expensive ground equipinent and facilities at terminal points remote from points it already
78
serves, the application of that carrier will be denied.
But assume that both or all applicants are fit, willing, and able
to conduct the proposed operation, and can do so at approximately
the same cost per trip. This close question the Board will resolve
by designating that carrier to whose existing system there is the
74
greater movement of traffic from the points on the proposed route,
or that carrier which is in a position to furnish through service along
that route to an important traffic center. 75
69. Trans-Southern. Airlines, Inc., et al., Amarlllo-Oklahomas City Operation Order No. 656, Docket No. 12-401(B)-i and 195, 2 C.A.B. 250 (Sept. 24,
1940) (Memphis-Oklahoma City segment lopped off).
70. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation, Norfolk-Knoxville Route.
Order No. 652, Docket No. 245, 2 C.A.B. 207 (Sept. 17, 1940) (Knoxville-Cincinnati segment Involved in pending applications of Delta and Southern Air
Lines; see note 85, infra.)
71. Trans-Southern Airlines Inc., et al., Amarillo-Oklahoma City Operation, note 69, aupra (Trans-Southern's application denied; see note 91, infra).
72. Western Air Express Corporation et al Great Falls-Lethbridge Opera(Dec. 5,
tion, Order No. 796, Docket Nos. 31-401(B)-1 and 257, 2 C.A.B. 1940). (Inland's application denied).
73. Northwest Airlines, Inc, et al., Additional Service to Canada, Order
(March 8, 1940).
No. 1010, Docket Nos. 327, 254, 306, and 376, 2 C.A.B. (Canadian Colonial between Buffalo and Toronto).
74. Id. (Buffalo-Toronto route awarded to American Instead of to P.C.A.).
75. Braniff Airways, Inc et al, Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, Order
No. 757, Docket Nos. 1-401(B)-1, 4-401(B)-1, and 9-401(B)-3 2 C.A.B. 353
LDec. 6, 1940) (Evanaville-Louisville route given to Eastern) ; Continental Air
Lines, Inc., et al., Wichita-Pueblo Route, note 48, supra (Mandatory route given
to Continental Instead of Braniff). For the Senate's discussion of the latter route,
see 83 Cong. Rec. 6848 (1938) ; the House discussed It in 83 Cong. Rec. 7069
(1938).
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(3) Existing direct one company service; applicant proposes to
serve the same termini, either directly or indirectly.
In one case, the applicant sought authorization to carry mail
over its grandfather route, on which the intervener already furnished
a mail service as a part of a through route. Rather than increase
the number of the intervener's mail schedules, the Board authorized
the new service on the ground that the applicant's obligation to render
an adequate service under its existing certificate could not be fulfilled
76
by operating less than one daily mail schedule.
When it is not.a question of mail alone, but of full service that
the applicant proposes to furnish in competition with the existing
line, duplicating service will not be authorized simply for the sake
of providing competition, when the existing service is adequate and
the operator is capable of accommodating the foreseeable growth of
air traffic. 77 But in one case duplicating service was permitted along
a relatively short segment of a 1,500-mile route; since the diversion
of traffic from the existing carrier would be substantial, the certificate
78
prohibited the applicant from transporting local passengers.
(4) Existing indirect one-company or two-company service;
one or more applicants propose direct service between same termini.
If there is a relatively light movement of traffic along the existing route, authorization for the new route will be denied because of
the diversion of traffic from the established lines. 79 The application
76 Braniff Airways, Inc., Houston-Corpus Christi-San Antonio Operations,
Order No. 639, Docket Nos. 317 and 322, 2 C.A.B. 199 (Aug. 27, 1940) (Braniff
authorized to carry mail in addition to existing passenger and express service).
77. Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al.,Additional Service to Canada, note 73,
supra (Canadian Colonial's application for New York-Buffalo route, already
served by American) ; Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Kansas City-Wichita-New
Orleans Service, Order No. 1106, Docket Nos. 192, 251, 309, and 310, 2 C.A.B. (June 21, 1941) (Tulsa-Kansas City, already directly served by Mid-Continent:
application of Kansas City Southern denied).
Duplicating service has not been permitted along one segment of a route
awarded in the same proceeding to another carrier: Delta Air Corporation, et al.,
Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, note 66, supra (KnoxvilleAtlanta route being awarded to Delta, applications of PCA and Dixie denied).
78. Delta Air Corporation, et al., Additional Service to Atlanta and
Birmingham, note 66, supra (Birmingham included as intermediate point on
Eastern's route). Reaffirmed and clarified, Order No. 997, Docket Nos. 162,
et al., 2 C.A.B. (April 24, 1941). Eastern was later authorized to conduct
non-stop service between Birmingham and New Orleans; though Chicago and
Southern would suffer some diversion of traffic, this consideration was outweighed by the benefits to the public in the form of improved service; Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., Birmingham-New Orleans Non-Stop Service, Order No. 998,
Docket No. 566, 2 C.A.B. (April 24, 1941).
79. Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, Note
75, supra (American operating between Memphis and Louisville via Nashville;
applications of Braniff, Eastern, and C. & S. for route between Memphis and
Louisville, via Paducah and Evansville, denied). Trans-Southern Airlines, Inc.,
et al., Amarillo-Oklahoma City Operation, note 69, supra (Applications of
Braniff and Trans-Southern for Atlanta-Memphis segment of Atlanta-Amarillo
route denied, when Eastern and Delta operated connecting service along that
segment). Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Kansas City-Wichita-New Orleans Service, note 77, supra (Wichita-New Orleans, already connected by Braniff and
Eastern).
But if the possible diversion to a proposed intersecting route will be offset
by connecting business that the new route will develop for the Intervener at
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will likewise be denied if only a slight saving in distance is contemplated,8 0 or if substantial expenditures by the government would be
required, even though the new service would effect a considerable
saving in distance, flying time, and passenger fares. 81 The denial
is made more certain if the applicant and the smaller existing line
are the only competitors within the entire region. 82 The threatened
diversion of traffic to the new line has been the ground for denying
a certificate where two carriers propose a new service over different
routes, one of which is partly served by one applicant. In an early
consolidated proceeding, an extension of the existing route was
authorized in order to safeguard the efficient and economical operation of a small line which was the only competitor of the larger line
within the entire state.8 3
But new one-company service has been authorized where the
route will effect proportionately large savings in distance, flying time,

and passenger fares,8 4 and will give direct service between important
intermediate points already served only indirectly. 5 The new route
has been awarded to that applicant which could operate it as an
integral part of its system rather than as a mere spur, thus enabling
the point of intersection, the opposition of the intervener will be overruled;
Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corporation, Norfolk-Knoxville Route, note 70,
supra.
80. Delta Air Corporation, et al., Additional Service to Atlanta and
Birmingham, note 66, supra. (New Orleans-Birmingham-Cincinnati, already
served by four connecting two-company routes; 37 miles to be saved). Braniff
Airways, Inc., et al 6 Kansas City-Wichita-New Orleans Service, note 77, supra
(Kansas City-New rleans, already connected Indirectly by TWA and C. & S. ;
applications of Kansas City Southern and Mid-Continent denied. The Board
observed: "It would appear to be unsound to grant authority to an applicant to
engage in air transportation over a proposed route designed to supply through
service as against existing service rendered by two or more connecting carriers
until it has been shown that the connections provided In good faith have over a
reasonable period of time proved inadequate or unless, aside from the question
as to adequacy of connections, there is other public need for an additional
service.")
81.
Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Kansas City-Memphis Route, Order No.
734, Docket Nos. 196, 9-401(B)-4, and 368, 2 C.A.B. 288 (Nov. 15, 1940)
(Applications of Braniff, Eastern, and C. & S. denied In toto, when service
available by combined routes of TWA and C. & S.). Braniff Airways, Inc., et al.,
Kansas City-Wichita-New Orleans Service, note 77, supra (Shreveport-New
Orleans, already served by connecting services of Delta and C. & S.; applications of Mid-Continent, Kansas City Southern, and Braniff denied).
82. National Airlines, Inc., et al., Daytona Beach-Jacksonville Operation,
Order No. 441, Docket Nos. 5-401(B)-i, 222, 9-401(B)-i, and 203, 1 C.A.J. 163,
1 C.A.A. CV (March 21, 1940) (Eastern's application for direct route between
Tampa and Miami denied).
83. Id. (Applications of Eastern for Tampa-Jacksonville and OrlandoTallahassee routes denied, and Jacks6nville-Daytona Beach route given to
National).
84. Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Kansas City-Wichita-New Orleans Service,
note 77, supra (Wichita-Tulsa, saving 50% in mileage and more than 60% In
fare; awarded to Continental rather than Braniff). Delta Air Corporation, et al.,
Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, note 66, supra (PittsburghBirmingham, stressing community of interest between points served and circuity
of rail and air service; awarded to PCA rather than Dixie, see note 92, infra;
Messrs. Warner and Baker felt that the new service was not yet warranted.
Also Atlanta-Savannah route, already served by connecting routes of Eastern
and Delta awarded to Delta rather than Eastern, PCA, or Southern Air Lines).
85.
lelta Air Corporation, et al., Additional Service to Atlanta and
Birmingham, note 66, 8upra (Atlanta-Cincinnati, already served by Eastern and
American; saving of 75 miles and $8.50 in fare; awarded to Delta rather than
PCA or Southern. Messrs. Warner and Baker dissented, favoring readjustment
of schedules on existing routes)..

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

it to make greater and more efficient use of its presently adequate
equipment, and to eliminate inconvenience to passengers ;8 a decisive
element has also been the close community of interest between the
points to be reached on a local service offered by only one applicant.8 7
A difficult problem has arisen in two cases, where one of the
applicants for the new service already conducted the existing indirect
one-company service. Having first found that the traffic needs of
the territory warranted the establishment of the new route, it was
necessary for the Board to decide whether it was to be operated by
the carrier already serving the same termini, or by one of the competing applicants.
In one case it was awarded to the existing carrier; not only
would the award to the other applicant divert traffic from the established route, but it would cause wasteful duplication of service and
destructive competition. In view of the relatively short distance between the termini, the Board foresaw the inauguration of non-stop
service between these points within a short time. If one carrier were
authorized to fly between these termini, it might be justified in
scheduling non-stop service at a comparatively early date. But if
two carriers operated between these points by different routes, both
'Would have the privilege of flying a non-stop service along the direct
route; not only might this competitive situation force the adoption
of such service before the time was ripe for either carrier in -view of
tr'affic potential, but such non-stop service would be made doubly
premature when inaugurated by both carriers.88
In the second of these cases, each of the applicants relied chiefly
upon the claimed adverse effect which operation by either of the
others would have upon its existing system through the diversion of
traffic. But the Board issued the certificate to the line which could
be expected to develop maximum traffic on the new route regardless
of its destination; neither of the other applicants intended to develop
through traffic over the new route to the detriment of their existing
systems. A second ground for the decision was the desirability of
the through service to important termini which could be furnished
86. See notes 84 and 85, supra.
87. Delta Air Corporation, et al., Additional Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, note 66, supra (Atlanta-Savannah, via Augusta; awarded to Delta rather
than Eastern, PCA, or Southern).

88. Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., et al., Twin Cities-Des Moines-Kansas
City-St. Louis Operation, Order No. 585, Docket Nos. 3-401(B)-i and -2, 182,
194; 2 C.A.B. 63 (July 18, 1940) (Mid-Continent given Y-shaped route, its very
indirect grandfather r6ute running between the Twin Cities and Kansas City,
via Omaha; Braniff's application denied for reasons here discussed and Northwest's since it had not aDplied for a substantial portion of the route$.
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by that airline.s9 This case is not inconsistent with the one first nentioned. Though competing lines were allowed to provide alternative
routes between the same termini, the distances between these points
renders it unlikely that either company ivill attempt to establish a
non-stop service. The elements of destructive competition and wasteful duplication were not present in the case.
Two predictions appear to be justified in the light of three of
the Board's decisions of the past year: first, no additional airlines
will be authorized to operate a transcontinental service out of New
York; and second, it will be virtually impossible for new airrines,
not already authorized to operate existing services, to enter the field.
In March, 1941, the Board denied Northwest's application for
a route between New York and Chicago or the Twin Cities, via the
alternative Canadian cities of Toronto or Windsor. 0 Northwest
intended primarily to render a transcontinental service which would
allow it to compete with United at Seattle for traffic destined for
New York, and which would save 84 miles over the route already
operated by United between those points. The application was
denied chiefly on the ground that the transcontinental traffic was very
light and that the existing competitors between New York and
Chicago could absorb any increase in traffic between these points by
the inauguration of additional flights, without cost to the government, and without inconvenience to transcontinental passengers requiring connections with Northwest's planes at Chicago. The Board
suggested that any inconvenience to passengers might be remedied
by an interchange of equipment at Chicago between Northwest and
either TWA or American. It further suggested the possibility that
future development of traffic might require additional facilities between the Twin Cities and the East over a more direct route than by
way of Chicago. In the meantime, Northwest does not appear to
have diminished its efforts to realize its "destiny" of becoming a
transcontinental operator; and one may well speculate about the
Board's attitude if Northwest were to seek a different Atlantic
Coast terminal, such as Washington.
When the Board denied the application of Trans-Southern
Airlines, Inc., for a route between Amarillo and Oklahoma City, its
action foreshadowed the closing of the gates upon the number of
89. Braniff Airways, Inc., et al., Houston-Memphis-Loutsville Route, note
75, supra (Houston-Memphis route given to C. & S. instead of to Braniff or
Eastern; C. & S. already operating between Memphis and Chicago, and Braniff
very indirectly between Houston and Chicago. Messrs. Branch and Baker disseated, favoring an award to Eastern).
90. Northwest Airlines, Inc., et al., Additional Service to Canada, note 73,
supra, The routes via Toronto were denied on other grounds, note 107, 4nfrc.
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air carriers which would be authorized to enter the field. 91 And
when it denied the application of Dixie Airlines, Inc., for the Pittsburgh-Birmingham route, it became more than ever apparent that
the small newcomers would fight an uphill battle to obtain a certificate. 92 It is reasonably clear that an untried, newly organized
company must either offer a unique service or propose a feeder route
before its application will be viewed with favor. Southern Air Lines,
Inc., proposed to operate a short system radiating from Atlanta,
carrying passengers and express without air mail compensation, to
be integrated with the flying school which it already conducted; but
its plans were so indefinite and the proposal was so speculative that
the Board found that it was not fit, willing, and able to perform the
service for which it applied. 93 But the Board granted the application
of All American Aviation, Inc., to engage in local feeder-line service,
using a device whereby mail and express would be picked up and
9 4
delivered in flight at intermediate points along the proposed routes.
It overruled the claims of TWA and Eastern that existing carriers
should have a preemptive right indeveloping feeder routes, as inconsistent with the policy declared in Section 2(d), and as ignoring
the fact that such service could not be rendered by lines engaged in
long-distance service over through routes. It concluded that any
such theory, "which would result in reserving solely for existing
airlines the privilege of providing all additions to the present air
transportation system of the United States, is untenable."9 5 One
concession, however, was made to the interveners; in order to prevent competition with them on their existing routes, the new applicant's certificate was qualified to prevent it from operating a nonstop service between the terminals served by its predecessor. In
finding that the new service was required by the public convenience
and necessity, the Board appears to have been intrigued with the
pick-up and delivery device, and felt that its technical and commercial development should continue.' 6
91
92:

Note 71 supra.
Delta Air Corporation,

93.
94.

Id.
All American Aviation, Inc., Pick-up and Delivery Service, Order

Birmingham, note 84, supra.

et

al.,

Additional

Service

to

Atlanta

and
No.

596, Docket No. 363, 2 C.A.B. 133 (July 22, 1940). The general subject of feeder
lines Is dealt with by B. E. Cole, Feeder Air Routes, (1940) 11 JOURNAL OF ATR
LAW 17.

95. Compare with the Board's later language In denying Dixie's application,
note 92, supra: "The number of air carriers now operating appears sufficient
to insure against monopoly In respect to the average new route case, and we
believe that the present domestic air transportation system can by proper supervision be integrated and expanded in a

manner that will in

general afford the

competition necessary for the development of that system In the manner contemplated by the Act. In the absence of particular circumstances presenting an
affirmative reason for a new carrier there appears to be no Inherent desirability
of Increasing the present number of carriers merely for the purpose of numerically enlarging the industry."
96. Another novel application was for Eastern's transportation of mail by
autogiro between the Camden Airport and the rooftop of the Philadelphia- Post

CONTROLLED COMPETITION

It is submitted that the Board's restrictive policy is entirely
sound and consonant with the purposes of the Act. Not only does
there appear to be no inherent reason for adding to the number of
authorized airlines, but there are positive arguments to the contrary.
The economic regulation of a limited number of established carriers
instead of a profusion of new lines would appear to be in the interests
of administrative simplicity and effectiveness. More important, the
financial stability of the industry is better assured by a restrictive
policy than by a policy which encourages new entrants to come into
the field. A careful apportionment of routes among existing carriers
would better guarantee the continued existence of those carriers than
would a policy of admitting experimental, untried lines into the field.
Not only would the expense to the government be minimized, but
the capital of the investing public would be given greater protection.
Of all new route applications, this much may be said: though
the Board has dismissed as a consideration in its choice of carrier
the relative size of the applicants in assets and route mileage, 97 all
of its decisions except three have been in favor of the smaller of
the established applicants.9 8 The Act was designed to protect the
small airlines from destructive competition. The effect of these
decisions has been to bolster the smaller lines so that they may survive
and compete more effectively with the larger carriers. Furthermore,
by adding to the mileage of the small lines, it is possible to spread
overhead expenses to a greater extent than if the mileage were added
to the larger lines. The economies thus resulting to the successful
applicant would tend to reduce the amount of airmail subsidy paid
by the government, a consideration which has bulked large in all
of the decisions.
The gaps in the great continental airway network are rapidly
decreasing in number and size, so that few cities of any commercial
importance are without air transport connections. As the saturation
point is approached with respect to the number of economically
desirable routes, the number of applicants for each route increases.
In almost every instance in which the Board has authorized a new
route, it has carved down the major part of the distance applied for i
and on occasion has denied the application in toto. In selecting the
carrier to render the service, the ultimate question will continue to
Office Building. The Board felt it Impossible to determine whether the permanent
establishment of the service was required by the public convenience and necessity; since the application had been flied for a permanent certificate under
401(d) (1), a temporary certificate could not be granted In the same proceeding.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.. Autogiro Service, Order No. 582, Docket No. 403,
2 C.A.B. 54 (July 16, 1940).
97. Continental Air Lines, Inc., Wichita-Pueblo Route (note 48. supra).
98. See notes 72, 73-74, and 75, supra.
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be the advantages of an increasingly competitive situation, weighed
against the disadvantages of an increasingly duplicated air transportation service. Exactly where the line is to be drawn in each situation
will be an increasingly perplexing problem. And as the number of
disappointed applicants grows, so will the likelihood of resort to the
courts for judicial review of the Board's decisions.
B. Overseas and Foreign Operations
It is in this field that the Board has had to face most squarely
the competition-monopoly issue, and where the bitterness, most
publicized, and perhaps the most significant battle is being waged
betweeen potentially- competing airlines.
1. Spur-Line Operations
Seven domestic airlines conduct overseas and foreign operations
which are unaffected by this conflict. Five were awarded grandfather
certificates, authorizing service between Chicago and Winnipeg,99
Seattle and Vancouver, 10 0 Boston and Montreal,'' New York and
Montreal, 02 and service on a route within the Hawaiian Islands. 108
The needs of the national defehse, and the desirability of closing
the gaps in the international airway service were important grounds
for authorizing additional service between Bangor and Moncton, 104
i °5
and between Great Falls and Lethbridge.
The issue of competition entered into the last-mentioned case
only, a consolidated proceeding which has already been discussed.
But there was keen rivalry in a second consolidated proceeding, which
involved the Air Transport Arrangement of August 18, 1939,106
between the governments of the United States and Canada. By a
subsequent exchange of notes, it was agreed that the Buffalo-Toronto
99. Northwest Airlines, Inc., Grandfather Proceeding, note 36, mtpra,
100. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, Grandfather Proceeding, note
36, aupra
Certificate later amended to permit carriage of mail on same route: United
Air Lines Transport Corporation, Seattle-Vancouver Mail Service, note 61, supra.
101. Boston-Maine Airways, Inc., Grandfather Proceeding, note 36, supra.
102. Canadian Colonial Airways Inc Grandfather Proceeding, Order No.
822, Docket No. 45-401(E)-i
1 C.AJ. 48; 1 C.A.A. XXIV (Jan. 9, 1940)
(Holding that neither the requirements of citizenship nor of continuous operation
as an air carrier were affected (1) by the fact that the applicant conducted
operations under lease-purchase agreements with American, or (2) by the intercompany financial arrangements with the Canadian subsidiary relating to the
division of expenses and revenues on northbound and southbound routes).
Intermediate stops at Burlington and Glens Falls authorized later, and
shortened New York-Albany service permitted: Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc.,
Burlington-Albany-Glens Falls-Lake Placid Operations, note 58, upra.
103. Inter-Island Airways, Ltd., Grandfather Proceeding, Order No. 72,
Docket No. 25-401(E)-i (June 16, 1939).
104. Boston-Maine Airways, Inc., Bangor-Moncton Operation, Order No.
739, Docket No. 290 2 CA.B. 317 (October 28, 1940).

105. Western Air Express Corporation, et al., Great Falls-Lethbridge Operation, note 72, supra.
106. Executive Agreement Series No. 159.
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route was to be operated solely by a United States carrier, while
non-stop routes between Toronto and New York would be operated
solely by a Canadian line; routes from Windsor to any points in the
United States would be served only by a United States line, and
routes from Detroit to any points in Canada, by a Canadian line.
In view of this arrangement, the Board denied the applications of
American and Northwest for the Detroit-Toronto route, and the
applications of American and Canadian Colonial for the New YorkToronto service. 10 7 For the same reason, it denied the application
of Trans-Canada Air Lines for a foreign air carrier permit to operate
between Toronto and Buffalo, but granted it the Toronto-New York
non-stop service.10 8 In a companion proceeding decided on the
same day, 10 9 it amended American's New York-Chicago certificate to
include Windsor and Niagara Falls, thus giving it almost the identical
route which it had denied Northwest. 110
Finally, an interim opinion has been rendered in the matter of
the applications of thirty-eight small Alaskan airlines for,certificates
under Section 401. In view of the inadequate state of the applicants'
records, and of the sweeping change that would be involved in bringing the Alaskan lines within the statutory scheme of regulations, the
Board reopened the proceedings for further investigation.,11
2. Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific Operations
The first certificate granted to Pan American Airways1 12 authorized operations over the new routes with termini at New York, London, and Marseilles: north, via New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and
Ireland; and south, via Bermuda, Horta, and Lisbon. 113 By an exchange of notes with the governments of France and England, the
United States government had secured six weekly landing rights
in the two countries, to be granted to American air carriers. Pan
American had applied for a grant of all six, and called attention to
the provision in Section 401(f)1 4 in support of its claim. But the
Authority recognized the monopolistic position that Pan American
107. Northwest Airlines, Inc., et a., Additional Service to Canada, note
73, &upra.
108. Trans-Canada Air Lines, Toronto-Buffalo-New York Route, Order No.
1009, Docket Nos. 308, 811, and 312 2 C.A.B. (March 8, 1941).
109. American Airlines, Inc., Windsor and Niagara Falls Operation, Order
No. 1008, Docket No. 397, 2 C.A.B. (March 8, 1941).
110
Note 90, supra
111. Alaska Air Transportation Investigation, Order No. 1153, Docket Nos.
71-401(E)-i et al., 2 C.A.B. (July 21, 1941).
112. For a history of Pan American's origin and expansion, see "The
Coming Struggle for the Air Lanes," Fortune, March, 1941 pp 128 et seq.
113. Pan American Airways Company (Delaware), ;Trans-Atlantlc Operations Order No. 55, Docket No. 163 (May 17, 1939).
114. "No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the
right of an air carrier to add to or change schedules . . . for performing the
authorized transportation and service as the development of the business and
the demands of the public shall require."

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

would occupy, contrary to Section 2(d). It held that although the
limitation of Pan American's landing rights might result in a curtailment of its schedule, the Authority's action was consistent with
Section 401(f), "since landing rights are the subject matter of the
restriction and schedules are only incidentally affected." It also felt
that the limitation was compelled by Section 1102, which requires the
Authority to take international agreements into consideration. Declining to estimate what frequency of flights would best fulfill the
requirements of Section 2, it left the determination to future developments, and for the time being, awarded the applicant only two of
the six available weekly landing rights. A grandfather certificate
later authorized the New York-Bermuda service, and a "temporary"
certificate to operate between Baltimore and Bermuda via New York
was denied. 11
The Nevada subsidiary was given its grandfather certificate to
operate over the Pacific route from San Francisco to Hong Kong. 116
A second leg was added to these operations by the authorization of
service between San Francisco and Auckland, New Zealand, via
Los Angeles. Finding that the inclusion of Los Angeles was justified
by the public interest and required by the national defense, the
Authority was careful to prohibit Pan American from engaging in
local service between Los Angeles and San Francisco, thus foreclosing
the possibility of the applicant's engaging in purely continental operations, and restricting it to overseas and foreign transportation.'"1
Finally, operations were extended into Alaska by Pacific Alaska
Airways, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary. This company was given
a grandfather certificate for local service entirely within Alaska, 118
and a certificate for a new route between Seattle and Juneau ;119 in
each proceeding the Authority denied permission to engage in certain
specified local service, in order to protect a number of Alaskan
carriers which had grandfather applications pending.
Pan American had thus staked out a trans-Atlantic and transPacific empire, with its termini in London and the English crown
colony of Hong Kong. In this empire it had no American com115. Pan American Airways Company (Delaware), New York-Bermuda
Operations, Order No. 205, Docket No. 37-401(E)-I (Sept. 29, 1939).
116. Pan American Airways Company (Nevada), Trans-Pacific Operations,
Order No. 78, Docket No. 6-401(E)-1 (June 27, 1939). This certificate was later
amended to authorize operations for five years between Manila and Singapore:
Pan American Airways Comnany
(Nevada),
Singapore Operation Order No.
25, 1941).
(Peb.
1021, Docket No. 511, 2 C.A.B.
117. Pan American Airways Company (Nevada), New Zealand Operations,
Order No. 552, Docket No. 6-401(E)-2 and 305, 1 C.A.J. 273, 1 C.A.A.
CLXXXVITI (June 7, 1940).
118. Pacific Alaska Airways, Inc., Grandfather Proceeding, Order No. 540,
Docket No. 10-401(E)-I, 1 C.A.J. 269, 1 C.A.A. CLXXXIII (May 29, 1940).
119. Pacific Alaska Airways, Inc., Seattle-Juneau Operations, Order No.
539, Docket No. 14-401(B)-i, 1 C.A.J. 263. 1 C.A.A. CLXXVf (May 29, 1940).
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petitors, and in the trans-Atlantic field shared the traffic only with
Imperial Airways, Ltd., which had been given foreign air carrier
rights for flights between the United Kingdom and New York, via
the northern route of Canada, Newfoundland, and Ireland, and via
120
Bermuda.
A potential trans-Atlantic competitor had appeared when American Export Airlines, Inc., was incorporated in 1937 as a subsidiary
of American Export Lines, Inc., a steamship company. 121 Two years
later it filed for approval under Section 412(a) an agreement with
Pan American, which, in substance, divided the eastern hemisphere
into "spheres of influence", northern Europe being allotted to Pan
American and southern Europe, western Asia, and Africa to American Export. The Authority disapproved the contract, sensing a
potential monopoly in the proposed race for rights in foreign countries, and fearing that the contract "might discourage" the realization
of the policies declared in Section 2.122
Shortly thereafter, American Export filed an application for
routes (1) between New York and Marseilles, (2) between New
York and Southampton, and (3) between New York and Rome via
Horta, Lisbon, and Barcelona. 123 The applications for service to
England, France, Spain, and Italy were denied, in view of the
presidential proclamations1 24 pursuant to the Neutrality Act of
1939,125 which precluded operations to the combat zone as therein
defined.
Pan American had been granted leave to intervene in the proceeding, and both parties made it clear that the basic issue was the
inauguration of a second United States trans-Atlantic service over
the general north Atlantic route, rather than service between any
120. Imperial Airways, Ltd., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, Order No. 129,
Docket No. 147 (Aug. 4, 1939), and Order No. 156, Docket No. 48-402(C)-i
(Aug. 29, 1939).
121. For a history of the financial vicissitudes and unsavory past reputation of American Export Lines, and of the incorporation and early projects of
its subsidiary, see Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 10,539, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940) 194-216; Hearings before
Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations on Post Office Department Appropriation Bill for 1942, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 571-574, 594; "The Coming
Struggle for the Air Lanes", Fortune, March 1941, pp. 128 et seq.
The Maritime Commission had suggested in 1937 that steamship lines should
establish subsidiary and supplementary airlines over their routes instead of
building superliners to attract the luxury express passenger traffic: United States
Maritime Commission, Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine
(1937) 22-25. But more than a year before, American Export Lines had commenced plans for such a project: Gardner, Hearings on H.R. 9738 (note 17
&upra), at 283.
122. Pan American Airways Company (Delaware), American Export Airlines, Inc., et al., Agreement, Order No. 31, Docket No. 412-B-1 (April 7, 1939).
123. American Export Airlines, Inc., Trans-Atlantic Service, Order No.
581, Docket No. 238, 2 C.A.B. 16 (July 12, 1940) ; noted in 12 Air L. Rev. 166
(1941)
124. Proc. No. 2376, 4 Fed. Reg. 4495 (Nov. 4, 1939); Proc. No. 2410.
5 Fed. Re.4 2209 (June 11, 1940).
125.
Stat. 4 (1939), 22 U.S.C. 245J (Supp. 1940).
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particular terminals. The Board first decided that Pan American's
two weekly schedules 120 were insufficient to meet the demands of the
service, and that additional air transportation over the north Atlantic
trade route was justified. Thus the question was squarely raised
whether Pan American would continue to enjoy its monopoly over
this route by an extension of its existing service, or whether American Export would be permitted to thrust an entering wedge into a
127
field already occupied.
First observing that it lay in the Board's discretion to require
or to prohibit competition according to the peculiar circumstances
of each case, 128 the opinion stated the specific reasons for breaking
the Pan American monopoly. First, the inauguration of services
by a competing American line would stimulate and accelerate technical
advances in the whole industry. This competition would not be supplied to the same degree, and with the same beneficial effects, by
foreign-flag carriers. 129 It is also to be noted that overseas and
foreign operators, like Pan American and American Export, are
not subject to such comprehensive economic regulation under Title
IV of the Act as are domestic operators. It imposes no duty to
provide adequate services, equipment, and facilities; the stimulus to
do so must be supplied by United States competitors. The Board
cannot regulate fares, rates, and charges; competition must be the
medium through which control is exercised. 180 Second, the national
defense would benefit from such competition, since the research and
126. Pan American was authorized to run three trips per week on June 18,
1940, several weeks after the conclusion of the American Export hearings:
Branch, Hearings on H.R. 10,539 (note 121, supra), 187.
127. "The issue thus presented involved the entire underlying policy of the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938": 2 C.A.B., at 29.
128. "We conclude that competition in air transportation In not mandatory,
especially when considered in relation to any particular route or service. Clearly,
Congress has left to the discretion of the Board the determination of whether
or not competition in a particular area is necessary to assure the sound development of an appropriate air transportation system." 2 C.A.B.. at 31.
129. At present, no competition is supplied by foreign-flag air carriers.
Compagnie Air France Transatlantique, by Order No. 500 of May 7, 1940, was
permitted to continue its experimental flights to New York from May 1 to
November 1, 1940, and to carry French mail on its westbound crossings. Due to
the war, these flights were discontinued. Imperial Airways, Ltd., after securing
its foreign air.carrier permit on August 4, 1939 (see note 120, aupra), inaugurated scheduled trans-Atlantic service but discontinued operations in September
on the outbreak of the war. British Overseas Airways Corporation was created
as a government-controlled corporation to be Imperial's successor-in-interest;
on July 29, 1940, the Board approved the transfer of Imperial's permit to Airways (Atlantic) Ltd., a subsidiary of the new corporation: Airways (Atlantic)Limited, Permit to Foreign Air Carrier, Order No. 625, Docket No. 401, 2 C.A.B.
181 (July 29, 1940).
This permit, together with the permit of Airways
(Bermuda) Ltd. was then transferred back to the parent company, but operations have not been resumed: British Overseas Airways Corporation, TransAtlantic and Bermuda Operations, Order No. 1150, Docket No. 614, 2 C.A.B. (June 23, 1941).
130. "We are unable to find that the continued maintenance of an exclusive
monopoly of trans-Atlantic American flag air transportation is in the public
interest, particularly since there is no such public control over the passenger
or express rates to be charged or over the standards of service to be rendered
as is customarily provided in the case of a publicly protected monopoly."
2 C.A.B. at 34.
Chairman Branch emphasized this point in testifying at the hearings on the
first appropriation bill: Hearings on H.R. 10,589 (note 121, supra), 261.

CONTROLLED COMPETITION

development by foreign competitors would not be available to the
national defense of this country.' 8 '
The Board next observed that the additional cost to the government in subsidizing American Export's service should not have controlling significance in this case; it also declared that the alleged
superiority of Pan American's equipment was not decisive of the
issue and that it was a matter for decision by the traveling public.
After making the further findings of fitness, willingness, and ability,
the Board adjudged American Export entitled to a temporary certificate to transport passengers, express, and mail between New
York and Lisbon in the new Vought-Sikorsky 44's when completed,
and to a second temporary certificate, valid until September 1, 1941,
to transport mail and express only between the same termini in the
Consolidated survey ship.
The Board's action precipitated the issue into the national
spotlight. Pan American secured a certification of the record for
8 s2
review by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, '
and the Board promptly moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
that the court was without jurisdiction to review the order. The
court granted the motion,' 8 holding that Section 1006(a) 1 3 4 does
not authorize review of an order which is subject to approval or
disapproval by the President,' 8 5 who is the "ultimate arbiter"; the
authority vested in him would render judicial review futile.
Although the appeal was dismissed on the question of jurisdiction, it is difficult to see how the Board's order could have been
reversed if examined on the merits. The decision was not compelled
by the language of Section 2(d) ; the Board expressly pointed out
that the consideration of the factor of competition was entirely discretionary.' 8 6 But this was clearly a test case. American Export had
spent three million dollars in three years in an effort to challenge
Pan American's monopoly, 137 and was the only formidable contender. If competition were denied here, it would be discouraged
for an indefinite length of time and possibly foreclosed forever.
131. Mr. Ryan. in testifying at the same hearings said that "the national
defense interests primarily tipped the scales" In American Export's favor, and
regarded them as "overwhelming the economic facts." Id., at 236.
132.

Order No. 778, 2 C.A.J. 34 (Dec. 20

1940).

133. Pan American Airways Co. v. Civil .Aeronautics Board, 121 F. (2d)
10 U. S. Law Week 2074 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1941).
134.

"Any order, affirmative

135.

Sec.

-,

or negative, issued by the Authority under

this Act, except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the
approval of the President as provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject
to review by the circuit courts of appeals of the United States ....
801:

"The issuance . . .. of . . . any certificate authorizing an

shall be
air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation ...
subject to the approval of the President."
136. Note 128 supra.
137. Slater, Hearings on Post Office Department Appropriation Bill for
1942 (note 121, supra), at 550.
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The ultimate question is whether the United States will emerge
from the war stronger in air transportation if it is conducted on a
monopolistic or on a competitive basis. Arguably, if Pan American
is allowed to monopolize the field for the United States, the cost to
the government will be less; and if there were two American competitors, foreign governments could play one against the other
to the detriment of both. It has also been suggested that foreignflag carriers could supply the competition necessary to stimulate
technical progress, and that the status of foreign air transportation
should be one of carefully controlled regional monopoly. 138 This
ultimate question involves the broadest issues of policy but the
decision appears to rest simply upon expediency, and the wisdom of
the Board's conclusion should not be open to challenge by the courts.
This victory of American Export merely proved to be another
step preliminary to the commencement of operations. The major
problem18 9 has been, and still is, to secure an airmail appropriation
from Congress; and it has been contended until recently that the
mail subsidy is essential before any trans-Atlantic service can be
operated. 1 40 The first estimate of $500,000 was approved by the
Bureau of the Budget, 141 but the committee of neither house reported
42
it favorably.'
The second estimate suffered no better fate. The first ground
of Congressional opposition was the cost to the government. Pan
American had now offered to schedule a fourth weekly trip which
would cost the government $468,000 per year as against one weekly
trip by American Export at $1,229,736 per year. The question simmered down to whether the government should pay this additional
sum in order to establish competition between the airlines, 143 and
the subcommittee decided the question in Pan American's favor.
138. Report of Federal Aviation Commission (note 22 supra), 88.
Mr. Edward P. Warner, a member of the Board, was also a member of the
Federal Aviation Commission. The Commission's advocacy of regional monopolies contemplated a control over standards of service which was not given by the
Civil Aeronautics Act. This point was emphasized in the opinion: note 130, supra.
139. Another obstacle has been the fifteen-year grant of exclusive landing
rights, given

to Pan

American

by

the Portugese

government.

This obstacle

seems of a secondary nature only; a clause provides that the exclusive feature
can be removed by agreement between the two governments, and the State
Department was advised in January, 1941, that an agreement with the Portugese government in all likelihood would be reached: Burke, Hearings on Post
Office Department Appropriation Bill for 1942 ((note 121, aupra), at 537. For
the text of the grant, see id., at 636 et aeq.
140. Branch, id., at 504; Slater, id., at 576. Juan Trippe, president of
Pan American, testified that even with the airmail subsidy, the trans-Atlantic
operations had not been profitable to date: id., at 628. In so doing, he answered
a question which had appeared uppermost in the minds of the subcommittee of
the Senate when considering H.R. 10,539: See Hearings on H.R. 10,589 (note
121, aupra), at 230.
141.
142.

H.R. Doe. No. 901, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940).
N.R. Rep. No. 2966, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940)

; Sen. Rep. No. 2196,

76th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1940).
143. Ludlow, Hearings on Post Office Department Appropriation
1942 (note 121, supra), at 345.

Bill for
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The second chief consideration was the matter of competition.
Naturally, the representatives of the Board stressed the desirability
of bringing another airline into the service, but they were met by
the retort that the unsettled world conditions in time of war made
144
the competitive situation in time of peace a matter of speculation.
Also discussed were American Export's financial condition, and the
adequacy and safety of its proposed equipment, but apparently
Congress did not balk over these questions. Neither committee reported favorably on the estimate, 14 the chief objections being the
increased cost to the government and the desirability, "under existing
conditions," of monopoly in trans-Atlantic air operations.
The hearings are significant in bringing to light several basic
considerations which the Board's opinion left relatively untouched,
and in sharpening the issues in a far more satisfactory manner. And
the action of the committees shows that the Board must write
opinions which will not only survive the courts but will also withstand
Congressional criticism; for Congress, in holding the purse-strings,
can effectively veto the policy-determination of the agency which
it has created.
3. Latin American Operations
Ten days after the Board authorized trans-Atlantic operations
by American Export, it granted grandfather certificates to three
components of Pan American authorizing operations to the southward. Pan American Airways, Inc., was granted seven routes which
touched or terminated in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Guianas,
Venezuela, Mexico, the Canal Zone, all the Central American republics, and many of the Caribbean islands.' 46 In a routine proceeding,
Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., secured its grandfather certificate for the route between Cristobal, C. Z., and Buenos Aires,
via twenty designated points in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile,
Bolivia, and Argentina. 1 47 Finally, Panama Airways, Inc., was
granted a certificate for the transportation of passengers and express
144. Johnson, id., at 580. Congressman Taber feared that there would be
no competition in the trans-Atlantic mail service; since the steamship line was
the only American line operating to Europe, the company would control both
ocean and air transportation over the Atlantic and freeze out Pan American:
Id., at 344, 514.
145. H.R. Rep. No. 60, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); Sen. Rep. No. 142,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). For the Senate debate on the appropriation, see
87 Cong. Rec. 3633-3644, 3704-3715, 3774-3793 (1914).
146. Pan American Airways Inc., Latin American Grandfather Certificate,
Order No. 592, Docket No. 14-41(E)-i, 2 C.A.B. 111 (July 22, 1940). The
Cristobal-Turbo route was later transferred to Uraba, Medellin, and Central
Airways; it was amended to include Balboa, C. Z., and extended to Medellin,
Colombia; Uraba, Medellin and Central Airways, Inc., Canal Zone-Central
Colombia Operation, Order No. 749, Docket Nos. 28-401(E)-i and 421, 2 C.A.B.
334 (Nov. 4, 1940).
147. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., Latin American Grandfather Certificate, Order No. 589, Docket No. 38-401(E)-i, 2 C.A.B. 104 (July 22, 1940).
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on scheduled service between Cristobal and Balboa, C. Z. The
applicant moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, on the ground
that exclusive jurisdiction over air transportation in the Canal Zone
is vested in the President by the Panama Canal Act of 1912, as
amended in 1937;148 the motion was denied, the Board holding that
149
there was no such limitation on its power to issue the certificate.
Pan American-Grace was later permitted to add six stops and
two mail services, and to abandon four stops. 150 The case is interesting in being the first in which the abandonment of stops was authorized, 15 and in bringing to the Board's attention the factor of competition by local South American airlines. The abandonment of
Tumaco, Colombia, was influenced by the interest of the Colombian
government in Avianca, 5 2 and its supposed hostility to the inauguration of a competitive service; the designation of Quito, Ecuador,
as an additional stop appears to have been influenced by the local
competition between Pan American-Grace and SEDTA, a Germancontrolled airline. The same subsidiary next obtained an amendment
to its certificate, by which one stop in Brazil and nine in Bolivia
were added. 158 It is noteworthy that a month previously, the operations of German airlines had been stopped by the Bolivian and
Peruvian governments; the Board stressed the importance of the
new service to the national defense because of its relation to hemispheric defense.
Pan American experienced its first setback in this field when
its application for Los Angeles-Mexico City service was denied.' 5 4
An affiliated Mexican company had been given a foreign air carrier
permit for the same route,' 5' but it was apparent that increased
passenger service was required. Instead of authorizing a parallel,
non-competing service by Pan American, the Board considered it
to be more in the public interest to permit an increase in the frequencies operated by the existing carrier. The Board expressed
reluctance to incur the expense of airmail compensation, which it
was not necessary to pay to the Mexican company. But it is difficult
14.
(1937).

87 Stat. 561, 48 U.S.C. 1305

(1912);

50 Stat. 486, 48 U.S.C. 1314a

149. Panama Airways, Inc, Grandfather Proceeding, Order No. 595, Docket
No. 27-401(E)-i, 2 C.A.B. 124 (July 22, 1940).
150. Pan American-Grace Airways Inc Amended Certificate, Order No.
136, Docket Nos. 459, 492, and 493, 2 C.KB. i'01 (Nov. 2, 1940).
151. The chief grounds were unsuitability of airport facilities and insignificance of traffic to and from these points.
152. Formerly SCADTA: 80% of its stock is held by Pan American, and
the balance by the Colombian government. For a history and account of
SCADTA, see Marchant, Aviation in Colombia, (1938) 9 Air L. Rev. 45.
152. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., Bolivian Operations, Order No.
1075, Docket No. 606, 2 C.A.B. (June 3 1941).
154. Pan American Airways, Inc., Los Angeles-Mexico City Operation,
Order No. 1167, Docket No. 318, 2 C.A.B. (July 7, 1941).
155. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion S. A., Los Angeles-Mexico
City
Operation, Order No. 1066, Docket No. 30-402(C)-1, 2 C.A.B. (May 29, 1941).
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to escape the conclusion that the decision was partly influenced by
the pending application for a route between Mexico City and points
in Texas by American Airlines, the intervener. It is not impossible
that the Board's desire to curb Pan American's unrestrained expansion was foreshadowed in the American Export case and further
reflected in its denial of the Mexico City service.
II
BUSINESS PRACTICES

Proceedings under Section 401 involve the relation of the
respective air carriers to the government through the issuance or
denial of a permit to engage in air transportation. In vying for
routes, the airlines assume a position antagonistic to each other.
In regulating business practices under Sections 408-415, the Board's
power concerns chiefly the relations of the various airlines with each
other, rather than with the government. Except with respect to
methods of competition, the airlines are not in a mutually antagonistic position; instead, the very closeness of these relationships may
be opposed to the general public interest.
A. Consolidation, Merger, and Acquisition of Control
While the Board is given wide discretion over the granting of
new route certificates by Section 401(d) under the standard of "the
public convenience and necessity," its discretion in approving the
merger or acquisition of existing companies is strictly limited. Section 408(a) makes unlawful a consolidation, merger, purchase,
lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control involving persons
engaged in any phase of aeronautics, without the Board approval. 156
Section 408(b) provides that the Board shall approve such proposals
if, after notice and hearing, it finds them not inconsistent with the
public interest: "Provided, That the Authority (Board) shall not
approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would result in creating a
monopoly. or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to

. .

. (the transaction)."

156. Karl A. Crowley Solicitor of the Post Office Department, was severely
criticized by Senators Mcdarran and Truman for having permitted, under Sec.
15 of the Air Mail Act of 1934, the consolidation of two competing lines-Pennsylvania-Central Airlines Corporation and Central Airlines, Inc.: Hearings
on S. 2 (note 31, supra), at 112-115. 159. On the other hand, Colonel Gorrell
observed that in some instances, mergers or acquisitions of control are not only
highly desirable but absolutely indispensable if competition itself is to be preserved, by preventing the disappearance of the weaker lines in bankruptcy: Id.,
at 503. He felt that a limited amount of common action among air carriers,
if kept open and subject to the Board's supervision, would result in the elimination of wasteful and unjustified duplication: Id., at 512.

-
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and thereby unduly
The proviso appeared in S. 3845 as "...
restrain competition or unreasonably jeopardize another air carrier .... " These words were studiously written into the bill in the
light of judicial decisions and administrative rulings, but were
stricken out in order to pacify Senators Borah' 57 and McKellar,
who wanted the prohibition to be inflexible. 158
Few cases have arisen as yet under this section of the Act. The
acquisition of an airport company by an aircraft manufacturer has
been approved in a decision which called for no formulation of new
policy. 159 And in another uncontested proceeding, 160 the Board
approved the acquisition by Pan American Airways, Inc., from its
parent company, Pan American Airways Corporation, of seven subsidiary air carriers' 01 and two airport companies ;162 it also approved
the merger of four subsidiary airlines 63 into Pan American Airways, Inc., and the transfer of their certificates to the latter company. The plan, purely internal to the Pan American system, was
designed to save taxes and to simplify bookkeeping, details of operation, and general intercorporate relationships.
Four other cases have raised important questions under this
Section, and may be classified as follows:
(1) Interpreting the proviso of Section 408.
One case involved a contract providing for successive leasings to each other of sleeper planes owned by United Air Lines
and Western Air Express. 16 4 United's route from New York to
San Francisco and Oakland connected at Salt Lake City with
Western's route from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles and San Diego.
157. When the words were stricken, Senator Borah further explained his
position: "Mr. President, the suggestion of my colleague that a merger necessarily destroys competition, in my judgment is not well sustained. There may
be a merger or there may be a combination, and It may not have any effect on
the question of competition whatever. It all depends upon the facts of each
case. What I desire to see accomplished is the preservation of the opportunity
of competition. When we say to the commission that these lines shall not do a
thing 'unduly' or 'unreasonably' It Is very different from saying that they shall
not do it. It gives too much room for unlimited construction." 83 Cong. Rec.
6732 (1988).
158. Senator McCarran felt that the omission of the words eliminated the
necessary flexibility of human Judgment, and that it would now make impossible any such transaction. The whole debate on the subject appears at 83
Cong. Bec. 6729-6732 (1938).
159. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, et al., Acquisition of United Airports
Company, Order No. 745, Docket No. 507, 2 C.A.B. 328 (Nov 22 1940).
160. Pan American Airways, Inc., et al., Meger, Order No. 899, Docket
No. 454, 2 C.A.B. (Dec. 31, 1940).
161. Pan American Airways Company (Delaware) ; Pacific Alaska Airways. Inc.: Panama Airways, Inc.; Uraba, Medellin and Central Airways, Inc.;
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S. A.; Compania Nacional Cubana de Avlacion, S. A.; and Panair do Brasil, S. A.
162. Pan American Manufacturing and Supply Corporation; Marine Airport Corporation was acquired from the Delaware subsidiary.
163. Pan American Airways Company, of Nevada and of Delaware; Pacific
Alaska Airways, Inc.; Panama Airways, Inc.
164. United-Western Sleeper Exchange Case, Order No. 557, Docket No.
215, 1 C.A.J. 301, 1 C.A.A. CCXV (June 19, 1940).
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The agreement for pooling of equipment was designed to provide
through service on these connecting routes and to avoid the necessity of passengers changing planes at inconvenient hours of the
night. 165
,TWA, as intervener, claimed that the contract would give
United a virtual monopoly of all the west coast business, in violation
of the proviso. In construing Section 408 as a whole, the Authority
concluded that an acquisition or lease which restrains competition
or jeopardizes another air carrier is prohibited only in the event
that either one or both of such results will follow from the creation
of a monopoly. And it accepted a definition of the word "monopoly"
as referring to "a particular degree of control of air transportation,
or any phase thereof, in any territory or section of the country."
The opinion then demonstrated that there was no existing domination or control of Western by United, and that the agreement did
nothing to alter the situation; therefore, it did not result in creating
the monopoly prohibited by the proviso.
But one concession was made to TWA. The contract omitted
any rental charge based on the depreciation of planes subject to the
lease. If United should furnish more planes than Western for the
Los Angeles service, the absence of such a charge would operate
to Western's advantage, and "might be sufficient inducement to discourage competition and increase the possibility of United exercising
some control over the policies of Western." To avoid this possibility,
the Authority conditioned its approval upon the adoption of a rental
charge covering such depreciation.
(2) Interpreting "not inconsistent with the public interest."
Together with the proposed interchange agreement, United had
also filed for approval a proposed acquisition of Western by
United. 168 The Hon. Roscoe Pound, as special trial examiner
165. This contract was the third of its kind to be submitted for official
approval. In 1937, the two companies had sought a through passenger and
express service between New York and Los Angeles via Salt Lake City.
Solicitor Crowley ruled that the agreement amounted to actual control by United
of practically every detail of Western's operations; he feared that if permitted,
such agreements would result in the concentration of complete control of the
air transport Industry in the hands of a few large monopolistic corporations.
8 JOURNAL Or AIR LAW 635 (1937).

A second proposal was then submitted, providing for the operation of
through sleeper plane passenger and express service on the same routes. It too
was rejected on the same grounds, the Solicitor believing that it differed from
the first only in the degree, and not in the character, of control by United over
Western. 8 JOURNAL OF Am

LAW 651 (1937).

166. United-Western Merger Case, Order No. 558, Docket No. 270, 1 C.A.J.
314, 1 C.A.A. CCXXX (June 19, 1940); on reargument reaffirmed without
opinion: Order No. 629, 1 C.A.J. 430 (August 14, 1940) ; noted in 11 Air L. Rev.
310 (1940) and 11 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 359 (1940).
Aside from the principles at issue, the case is Interesting in being the first
in which a formal pre-hearing conference was held: 1 C.A.J. 54. Further prehearing conferences were conducted after this proceeding was concluded; and
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recommended approval of the application, finding the merger to be
in the public interest because of the elimination of the change of
planes at Salt Lake City. The examiner gave the same grammatical
construction to the proviso as did the Authority in the sleeper interchange case. But he appears to have taken the word "monopoly"
to mean a virtual monopoly, one which exists because competition is
improbable for economic reasons. Distinguishing air carriers from
railroads in the relatively small investment required to establish a
new line, he said that a virtual monopoly in a whole region was
impossible where other airlines can extend their routes into this
region, uninhibited by large investment. And he seems to have dismissed the possibility of an exclusive, perpetual, law-granted
monopoly, since competitors may always apply to the Board for new
routes or for extensions of existing routes. 167 Not only did he
conclude that the acquisition would not result in creating a monopoly.
but he also found that there would be only incidental interference
with existing competition. He pointed to the many factors which
already unified the companies, and showed that the effect of the
agreement would simply continue a condition existing before the
merger.
The Authority denied the application upon the ground that it
would be inconsistent with the public interest, thus rendering unnecessary a consideration of the proviso. United's argument of convenience to passengers was scotched by the approval of the sleeper interchange. The chief consideration was the factor of competition,
injected by Section 2(d) into the standard of "the public interest."
Reversing the examiner's finding on this point, the Authority concluded that in fact a competitive situation existed between Western
and United for north-south business between Los Angeles and
Spokane, and between Salt Lake City and Seattle; Western also
afforded a route connecting with Northwest between Salt Lake City
and the Twin Cities which was approximately the same length as
the alternative route between these same points via United and MidContinent. In language which was quoted in a later case, 168 the
Authority said:
"The intensity or the effectiveness of competition is not to
be confused with the existence of a competitive situation, and
it is not necessary that rates and times of departure be approximately the same ... in order to establish that competition exists.
on May 24, this procedure

was expressly authorized by an amendment

to Sec.

285.1 of the Economic Regulations, following the example of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
167. Compare the views of Colonel Gorrell, who reached the same conclusion on different grounds: note 28, supra.
168. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, (note 171, infra), at 2 C.A.B. 9.
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That two companies offer a comparable service between the
is enough to establish the existence of competisame points
69
tion."'1
The acquisition would give United direct access to the entire Pacific
Coast area for the origination of transcontinental traffic. Western
had the only north-south route west of the .Rockies independent of
the transcontinental airlines; the elimination of this competitor might
enable United to discourage other aspiring competitors. To the
examiner's suggestion that monopoly was impossible and that competing lines had only to apply for certificates of convenience and
necessity, the Authority answered that it could not compel the establishment of competing routes.
The opinions of the examiner and the Authority differed in two
chief respects. First, because they split over the question of existing
competition between United and Western, the basis of the decision
might seem to be one of economic fact-finding only. Second, while
the Authority gconsidered only the factor of competition and
stopped short of the proviso, the examiner discussed the proviso
exhaustively and focussed his attention upon the word "monopoly".
It is his concept of monopoly which appears to be open to criticism. 170 Dean Pound required much more to constitute a monopoly

than did the Authority. Under his definition, the proviso would, in
effect, be cut out of the statute, since there would never be the
monopoly in air transportation which is the basis of its prohibition.
Congress did not view a monopoly as exclusive, permanent control
of a region, which is an academic, theoretical meaning of the term.
It regarded monopoly in its layman sense, as a situation that permits
no possibility of competition in a particular area. Certainly it would
not have sanctioned such a merger of companies whose combined
routes dominated the Pacific Coast area and the territory west of
the Rockies.
A third case involved a proposed contract for the acquisition
of Marquette by TWA, 171 and its approval depended upon satisfying
the requirement of "the public interest" found in the relevant sections 408 (b), 412(b) and 401(i).
Marquette had been authorized to transport passengers and
express between Detroit and St. Louis, via Toledo, Dayton, and
169. 1 C.A.J. at 322, 1 C.A.A., at CCXXXIX.
170. The notes in 11 Air L. Rev. 310 (1940) and 11 JOURNAL Op AIR LAW
359 (1940) both support Dean Pound's recommendations; the latter note, however, takes the view that the proviso should not be construed as a limitation
supplemental to the public interest criterion.
171. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Order No. 678, Docket No. 115,
2 C.A.B. 1 (July 3, 1940) ; noted 11 Air L Rev. 424 (1940).
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Cincinnati; TWA had routes between Dayton and Chicago, and
between Dayton and St. Louis. The Board considered the contract
desirable because of the better service which TWA was prepared to
supply, and which was then impossible because of Marquette's lack
of proper operating equipment. In considering the proviso of Section 408(b), it noted that if the application were approved, TWA
would have competition from at least one of the other two transcontinental operators at every point on the route, 1" 2 and accordingly
found that the proposed acquisition would not result in the monopoly
prohibited by the proviso. 178 As other factors bearing upon the
public interest, the Board felt itself compelled to examine the consideration, terms, and conditions of the contract, and it balked over
the price as being excessive. The assets and going-concern value
of Marquette were found to be worth about one-fifteenth of the
contract price, which therefore represented in large part the consideration for the transfer of the certificate. Stating that a certificate
issued to an airline must not be treated as a speculative security,.the
Board denied the application.
Upon the basis of a modified contract, the Board reopened the
proceeding for a reconsideration of its earlier order. The majority
of the Board found the acquisition to be consistent with the public
interest, and approved it,17 4 on condition that the payments should
be deposited in escrow, pending a final decision in the Marquette
certificate proceeding. 175 As in the earlier case, the disputed ques172. Detroit: Penn-Central (Washington and Chicago, via Detroit) ; American (New York and Chicago, via Detroit). Toledo: United (New York and
Chicago, via Toledo). Dayton and Cincinnati: American (Cleveland and Nashville, via Dayton and Cincinnati).
St. Louis: American (Fort Worth and
Chicago, via St. Louis) ; Chicago and Southern (New Orleans and Chicago, via
St. Louis).
173. In view of certain disarming observations, this part of the opinion
-is open to closer study. The Board acknowledged that TWA would be the only
carrier operating between certain points, "as for example, between Detroit and
Toledo," but pointed out that this situation would not result from the acquisition
because Marquette had the only route between these cities. It did not notice,
however, that TWA and Marquette provided alternative routes between Dayton
and St. Louis, and that the acquisition would obliterate the competitive situation
between these two points. Both of these cities were served by American and
Chicago and Southern on their north-south routes, but these airlines afforded
no east-west competition. For two reasons, though, this oversight does not
appear to destroy completely the force of the finding. In the first place, when
the route is taken as a whole, it will be seen that American still would provide
an alternative service between Detroit and St. Louis via Chicago; the competition between these major termini would be intensified by putting two of the
stronger lines into direct competition. In the second place, the rail and bus
traffic between Dayton and St. Louis was shown to be very light, while between
Detroit and St. Louis the volume of traffic was approximately six times as great.
While the air traffic figures between these points were not in evidence, it was
clear that by far the greater number of passengers preferred TWA to Marquette
because of the latter's inadequate equipment and Infrequent schedules.
174. Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, Order No. 769, Docket No. 315,
2 C.A.B. - (Dec. 18, 1940).
175. On February 20, 1940, the Authority had reopened the grandfather
proceeding for the purpose of taking further proof upon the issue of Marquette's
citizenship during the grandfather period, with a view to possible modification
of its previous order. (Order No. 898). This proceeding was consolidated with
the acquisition case for the purpose of hearing. By agreement of the parties,
the opinion in the acquisition case was rendered while the record in the grand-
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tion was the excessiveness of the price. The public interest in this
matter rested in the fact that an unreasonable price might lead to a
depletion and waste of TWA's assets, resulting in an impairment of
the service rendered by the airline, or in a burden upon the public;
TWA might recoup the additional price either through increased mail
compensation or through increased fares.
Underlying this question was the basic issue which divided the
Board: whether the value of the certificate of convenience and necessity should be included in the purchase price. Mr. Ryan withdrew
from his former position, and with Chairman Branch, who had not
participated in the first decision, held that the value of the route
should be taken into account for the purpose of the sale, though
not for rate-making purposes. They followed the practice of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in its administration of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce and Motor Carrier Acts which
are comparable to Section 408(b), since the statutes are similar in
their general scope, purpose, and terms. Mr. Baker concurred in
the result, believing that unless the payment for the certificate
weakened the purchaser to such an extent as to jeopardize the adequacy of its service, the amount of the payment should be simply
a matter of managerial discretion. 176 Mr. Warner dissented, holding
to his former position that the value of the certificate should be
excluded from the terms of the acquisition. It was his opinion that
the inclusion of the certificate's value would result in a burden upon
the public. He further declared it an easy matter to determine the
total value of Marquette's assets "including good-will and going
concern value but excluding any value attaching to the bare certificate." This amount would be represented by "the difference
between the maximum commercial valuation that an open market
would place upon the operation, complete with certificate . . -and
the commercial valuation that would be similarly placed upon the
certificate alone, if it were for sale alone with no existing enterprise
of any kind attached to it."
There is much to support the view taken by the dissent. A
certificate is not a franchise, but a mere revocable permit conferring
father case was held open, pending efforts to obtain evidence on the question
of citizenship.
176. It is questionable, however, whether such a matter should be left too
freely to managerial discretion. In determining mail rates the Board might be
forced to recognize the pressure by the purchaser's investors for a greater
return on their investment. While the value of the transferred certificate would
not be recognized In regulating passenger rates, the presence of the subsidy
element provides a new and different point upon which this pressure may be
exercised.
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no exclusive property right in the route or its facilities. "7 A franchise grants a limited property interest and is associated with the
concept of privilege rather than with the concept of right; while
the Act recognizes transit through the navigable air space as resting
in right, not in privilege. 178 Furthermore. once an airline is established
and a certificate obtained, its management should be encouraged to
operate the line for service rather than find a market for the bare
certificate. It is apparent that the latter course was taken by Marquette's management. Having secured grandfather rights by operating with outmoded equipment, Marquette made little effort to
develop the commercial possibilities of its route, which were shown,
179
to be considerable when the route was operated by TWA.

Nevertheless, it is submitted that the majority ol)inion is sound
in following the precedents of the Interstate Commerce Commission
decisions, which have been undisturbed by the courts. The dissent,
curiously enough, seems to have had little faith in the Board's ability
to curb the imposition upon the public which was feared. Further,
though the dissent searched more deeply into the basic issue than
did the majority opinion, the conclusions which are quoted above are
questionable as a matter of accounting. The computation of the total
value of the assets exclusive of the certificate is a purely academic
question, because a competitive market for the whole enterprise cannot always be available for the valuation of these items, and because
the existence of a bare certificate detached from an enterprise is
impossible, and therefore its calculation is impossible. It appears
inconsistent to imagine the sale of such a detached certificate in the
open market, and still hold to the view that a certificate should not
be treated as a speculative security.
(3)

Defining an "air carrier" under Section 408.

When American Export Airlines filed its application for a certificate, it also sought approval of its control by American Export
Lines, its parent steamship company, "if such approval is deemed
necessary." The airline had been incorporated in 1937 as a wholly
owned subsidiary of the steamship company. Pan American argued
that the Board's approval was necessary under Section 408(a) (5)
and 408(b) : that the acquisition of an air carrier would not take
177.
Civil Aeronautics Act, Sees. 302(a), 303, 401(j).
See Pennsylvania.
R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 116 Ohio 80, 155 N.E. 694, 696 (1927) ;
the case holds improper the payment of $157,"00 for the bare certificate of a

motorbus line.
178.

Sec.

3.

See

Fagg, Legal

Basis of the Civil Air Regulations

(1939)

10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 7, 9.
179.
This operation had been approved without opinion after the denial
of the first application: Order No. 600, 1 C.A.J. 409 (July 25, 1940).
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place until the corporate entity became an air carrier by receiving
its certificate and by actually undertaking to engage in air transportation. The Board accepted American Export's argument, and
held that Section 408 applies only where the acquisition occurs at
a time when the corporate entity is already an air carrier; that since
American Export was not an air carrier at the time when the steamship company acquired control of it, the Board's approval of such
acquisition was unnecessary. 180
Mr. Ryan dissented from the majority's conclusion and felt
that approval was required. He construed Section 408 as requiring
the Board to "regard the series of events which will result in the
control of an air carrier by the steamship company as constituting
an acquisition." He felt that it was not the purpose of Congress
to limit the jurisdiction of the Board to such an extent, and pointed
out the ease with which an air carrier would circumvent the Act by
forming a subsidiary corporation, and then causing it to engage in
the manufacture of aircraft.' 8 ' This view was adopted by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, when it declared that the
majority view was an "unduly literal interpretation of subdivision
(5)", and that "the Board ought not to have dismissed the application but should have proceeded to deal with it on the merits.' 8 2
It has been said that the majority opinion was arrived at by
"anomalous reasoning.' u8 3 One may at least question the reasoning,
and doubt that it was the Congressional intention to limit the Board's
jurisdiction in such a manner. One may also speculate upon the
Board's position had the application been filed by the parent company rather than by the subsidiary. It is arguable that this technical
difference in procedure would have rendered approval necessary, by
bringing into play Section 408(a) (6) and the second proviso of
Section 408(b).
It seems that Pan American was almost as intent upon preventing the acquisition of control as it was upon preventing the authorization of competing operations over the trans-Atlantic route. By its
180. American Export Airlines, Inc., Application for Approval of Control
by American Export Lines, Inc., Order No. 581, Docket No. 319, 2 C.A.B. 45
(July 12, 1940).
181. This possible loophole in the Act was noted in the appropriation hearIngs, and Congressman Keefe expressed himself in favor of correcting it:
Hearings on Post Office Appropriation Bill for 1942 (note 121, supra), at 545.
But it is only in the control of an incipient airline that there Is such a loophole;
for if a subsidiary were formed for the manufacture of aircraft, its articles
would state its corporate purposes, and it would be such a manufacturer at the
very time of Incorporation. Any acquisition of control over this corporate entity
would necessarily take-place subsequent to its incorporation, and this transaction
would require the Board's approval.
182.

Note 133, supra.

183. Keefe, Hearings on Post Office Department Appropriation Bill for 1942
(note 121, supro), at 540.
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argument it placed itself in an anomalous position which could
hardly have escaped its notice. Pan American Airways Corporation
had controlled as subsidiaries Pan American Airways Company of
Nevada and Delaware, Pan American Airways, Inc., Pan AmericanGrace Airways, Inc., Pacific-Alaska Airways, Inc., and Panama
Airways, Inc., long before these subsidiaries were awarded their
certificates. Their position was similar to that of American Export
Airlines. 84 If the Board had accepted Pan American's argument,
the maintenance of these relationships would have been unlawful
under Section 408(a), and subject to the heavy criminal penalties
imposed by Section 902(a).
B. Interlocking Relationships
In general, Section 409 outlaws relationships in which any officer
or director of an air carrier is (or has a representative as) an officer,
director, member, or controlling stockholder18 5 in any other air
carrier, common carrier, aeronautical company, or aeronautical holding company. After February 19, 1939, such relationships were to
be illegal unless previously approved by the Authority as not adversely
affecting the public interest.' 86 Although the statute does not require
a hearing upon these applications, a hearing has been held wheret'er
there was any possible doubt concerning the effect of the relationship in question upon the public interest.18 7 While the Authority
disposed of a considerable number, favorably and adversely, it has
seen fit to issue only three orders which have been accompanied by
opinions. It is only from these three opinions that one may gather
upon what precise grounds the findings were based.
Since no express statutory standards are furnished, beyond the
broad test of "public interest", the Authority has proceeded with
caution in granting exceptions to the statutory prohibition. It places
upon the applicant the burden of showing affirmatively that the
public interest will not be adversely affected by the existence of a
particular interlocking relationship. Because of the potential conflict
of interest in negotiations for purchases by an air carrier from a
184. Pan American's position is distinguishable from that of American
Export in that the former's subsidiaries acquired certificates under the grandfather clause. Thus, it could be argued that such subsidiaries were air carriers
prior to the effective date of the Act, and that the acquisition of control was
therefore not subject to approval under Section 408.
185. S. 3845 prohibited, without prior approval, the holding of any stock
by any officer or director of an air carrier in one of the designated enterprises.
The House bill prohibited only the holding of a controlling interest, and in conference this latter provision was accepted. See H.R. Rep. No. 2636, 75th Cong.,
3rd Ses8. (1938), 72; report reprinted in full, 83 Cong. Rec. 8843-8868 (1938).
186. The breadth of the statutory standard was given only scant consideration in the deliberations prior to the passage of the Act. See Hearings on H.PA
9738 (note 17, supra) at 45.
187. First Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (1940), 24.
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manufacturer of aircraft used in air transportation, it has disapproved
the holding of a common directorship in such companies; the danger
of destroying a desirable arm's-length relation between buyer and
seller is not overcome by proof that the common director has played
188
no part in the negotiations or decisions relating to such purchases.
A common directorship in an airline and in a company holding investments in airlines will likewise be disapproved, since the intercorporate
mechanism might be abused to the detriment of the air carrier. 1 8 "
But no potential conflict of interest has been found in a common
directorship in an airline and in a manufacturer of military aircraft, 190 or of the holding of directorships in an airline and in a
company which operates an airport and a flying school. 191
C. Loans, Contracts, Methods of Competition
Section 410 empowers the Board to approve or disapprove
applications for loans from the United States or any agency, by or
for the benefit of any air carrier, and empowers it to prescribe the
terms and conditions upon which such loans are provided,19 2 Only
once thus far has action been taken under this section: an RFC
loan to Northwest for the purchase of equipment was approved, the
applicant desiring to compete on more equal terms on the eastern
part of its route with the transcontinental lines. 198
The Board is authorized, by Section 411, to issue a cease and
desist order if, after notice and hearing, it finds that an air carrier
is engaged in "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition." In one case, an airline charged that the inauguration
of additional schedules by a competitor constituted such prohibited
practices,'1 94 but the complaint was later withdrawn. 195 And in
another, it was held that the Section applied only to past or existing
188. Lawrence C. Ames--Interlocking Relationship, Order No. 289, bocket
No. 246, 1 C.A.J. 12, 1 C.A.A. III (Dec 11 1939) (Continental and Lockheed).
189. Lamotte T. Cohu-Interlocking helationship, Order No. 403, Docket
Nos. 166 and 289, 1 C.A.J. 96, 1 C.A.A. LI (Feb 21 1940) (TWA and Air
Investors, Inc.). Darling-Canadian Colonial Interiocldng Relationship, Order
No. 451, Docket No. 234, 1 C.A"J. 189, 1 C.A.A. CXXXIV (March 28, 1940)
(Canadian Colonial and The Aviation Corporation).
190. Lamotte T. Cohu-Interlocking Relationship, note 189, supra (TWA
and Northrop Aircraft, Inc.).
191. Darling-Canadian Colonial Interlocking Relationship, note 189, supra.
(Canadian Colonial and Roosevelt Field, Inc.).
192. The sole purpose of this provision was to give further control over
the business practices of the air carriers: Hearings on H.R. 9738 (note 17,
supra) at 438.
19A. Northwest Airlines Inc., Application for a Loan from RFC, Order
No. 33, Docket No. 223 (April 17, 1939).
194. Eastern Air Lines Inc v. American Airlines, Inc., Order No. 121,
Docket No. 249 (July 28, 1939). The Postmaster General had authorized the
transportation of mail on American's additional schedules; Eastern also charged
that it would be aggrieved by the Postmaster General's order within the meaning
of Section 405(e), and asked that such order be amended, suspended, or cancelled. This part of the complaint was dismissed on the ground that the designation of a mail schedule was not an "order" within the meaning of Section 405(e).
195. Order No. 337, 1 C.A.J. 61 (Jan. 16, 1940).
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practices or methods of competition, and not to future operations
under a proposed contract. 19 6
Section 412(a) requires every air carrier to file with the Board
a; copy of every contract affecting air transportation, between such
air carrier and any other carrier, for pooling and for designated types
of cooperative working arrangements, subsection (b) directs the
Board to disapprove or approve such contracts according to whether
it finds or does not find them to be adverse to the public interest,
or in violation of the Act. This section was involved in an agreement
between eighteen domestic airlines holding grandfather certificates,
governing the signatories in the issuance and exchange of passes and
reduced-rate transportation; the monopoly-competition issue appears
to have been absent from the case, and the Authority approved the
agreement as in furtherance of the public interest. 197 Section 412
was also involved in the disposition of three cases already discussed. 198
While there have been a substantial number of orders issued under
this Section, these are the only cases in which opinions have been
rendered.
It is natural that the Board's docket should have been more
occupied with applications for certificates of convenience and necessity than with matters concerning the relations of the air carriers
to each other. An air carrier's very existence depends upon staking
out a route over which it is authorized to operate, and upon securing
airmail authorization in order to make such operations financially
practicable. A scramble for these government grants was the necessary consequence of the passage of the Act, and any intercompany
arrangements were of secondary importance except insofar as their
continued existence required official approval.
As suggested above, the time is approaching when the number
of available new routes will reach the vanishing point. When this
time arrives, the work of the Board will enter its second major
phase-that of regulating the intercorporate relations of the aviation
industry.
CONCLUSION
The certificate of convenience and necessity is the fulcrum for
the economic control of the air transport industry. In order to
prevent the establishment of a monopoly over any terrain, it has been
196. United-Western Sleeper Exchange Case, (note 164, supra).
197. Airline Pass Agreement, Order No. 527, Docket No. 425, 1 C.A.J. 251,
I C.A.A. CLXX (May 24, 1940).
198. Notes 122, 164, and 171, supra.
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the Board's consistent policy to allow alternative service between
two points by competing lines where the demand for service is great
enough to support both carriers.' 99 If the traffic needs do not warrant a second service, the application is denied, since both lines
might collapse. This policy is clearly in accordance with the Congressional plan. 20 0 And where such duplication of service would
result in destructive competition and uneconomic practices, the air20 1
line serving the termini in question is given a regional monopoly.
The desirability of through service is a factor, but not controlling;
and the Board always considers whether the traffic on a competitor's
route will be diverted to an extent that will not be compensated by
traffic to be developed by favorable connecting service.
The grandfather clause set the pattern of the air routes, and the
effective date of the clause found four domestic airlines dwarfing
the others with respect to route mileage. In its unacknowledged
policy of favoring the smaller lines, the Board has endeavored to
overcome the effect of the grandfather clause by removing the disparity in route mileage as far as lies within its power; but it has
declared itself opposed to the invasion of the field by small newcomers. And in the back of the Board's mind is the hope that all
the airlines will attain such economic strength that the airmail subsidy
will eventually disappear.
A certificate of convenience and necessity to a limited extent
allows a monopoly in the legal sense, but the statute forbids a
monopoly created by merger. In connection with the issuance of
certificates, the word "competition" appears in a different grammatical context than in connection with the approval of mergers,
and only with respect to the latter does the word "monopoly" appear
at all. But it is submitted that the Board has proceeded in both
these fields with an entirely consistent notion of what constitutes
competition and the degree thereof which it is desirable to maintain.
In considering the merger applications, the -Board has permitted the
domination or control of a smaller line by a larger where the
situation will not stifle competition within a given section of the
country; if competition is endangered. the Board curbs any tendencies toward accentiating the effect of the grandfather clause. And
19.
"The present high quality of American air transport is largely due
to the competitive spirit that has existed throughout its development, There
has been little point-to-point competition on identical routes. Of much greater
benefit has been the availability of two or more alternative routes, served by
different companies, between widely separated centers." Report of the Federal
Aviation Commission (note 22, supra), at 61. See also Mid-Continent Airlines,
Inc., et al., Twin Cities-Des Moines-Kansas City-St. Louis Operation (note 88,
supra) at 2 C.A.13. 93.

200.

201.

See McCarran, 83 Cong. Rec. 6851 (1938).
Note 88, sup,,.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND- COMMERCE

in each of these fields the Board conceives of a competitive situation
as one in which two companies offer comparable service between the
same points; the effectiveness or the intensity of competition is
immaterial.
While it would be somewhat premature to venture a general
estimate of the success and effectiveness of the Board's economic
regulation, at least two observations may be made. In spite of the
intensity of the controversies, and the controversial nature of the
issues presented and decided, only one unimportant decision has thus
far been upset by the courts. Secondly, the chaotic financial condition
of the air transport industry has been remedied. Commercial revenues are increasing so satisfactorily as to lead the Board to expect the
substantial reduction of the mail pay required; economic stability
of the airlines is in prospect. 202 This result has been accomplished
by recognizing the air transport industry as a public utility, and by
exercising public regulation over private enterprise. 20 8 And instead
of adopting a system of state-controlled monopolies on the European
plan, the United States has maintained a system of controlled
competition within a framework of free enterprise.
202. Second Annual Report of the Civil Aeronautics Authority (1941), 1.
203. "Even after air transportation shall have attained a purely commercial footing, needing no direct support from the government, we consider
that It will still require control as a public utility and one which in some cases
must take on a monopoly character." Report of the Federal Aviation Commission (note 22, supra), 52.

